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INTRODUCTION
T HE United States has long maintained commitments to the inter-
national legal order, dating back to the Founding. In fact, the
Framers held the Constitutional Convention in large part due to the
perceived inability of the Confederation to uphold American obliga-
tions under international law.' They recognized the international
legal significance of U.S. independence: As new members in the com-
munity of nations, the Founders felt bound, both ethically and
pragmatically, to inherit and abide by the law of nations.2 The Consti-
tution reflected this disposition in both text and structure.3
1. See Frederick W. Marks III, Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the
Making of the Constitution 142 (1973); see also Finzer v. Barry 798 F.2d 1450, 1455
(D.C. Cir. 1986). Judge Bork wrote:
The need for such authority was, of course, one of the reasons a new consti-
tution was desired, and the power was placed among the great powers
granted the new government. Implementation of the law of nations by the
American government was seen as crucial to the conduct of our foreign rela-
tions, a subject of pervasive concern in the Constitution.
Id.
2. See Ware v. Hylton 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796) ("When the United States
declared their independence, they were bound to receive the law of nations, in its
modern state of purity and refinement."); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419,
474 (1793) ("[T]he United States had, by taking a place among the nations of the
earth, become amenable to the law of nations; and it was their interest, as well as their
duty, to provide, that those laws should be respected and obeyed ....").
3. See 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 26, 27 (1792) (Att'y Gen. Randolph) ("The law of na-
tions, although not specially adopted by the constitution or any municipal act, is es-
sentially a part of the law of the land. Its obligation commences and runs with the
existence of a nation ...."); Military Commissions, 11 Op. Att'y. Gen. 297, 299
(1865). Attorney General Speed opined that:
[Vol. 66
1997] HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS & U.S. LAW 465
Under the Constitution, the Framers assigned the federal judiciary
jurisdiction over most law of nations questions. Article III provided
federal jurisdiction directly over the principal juridical subjects of in-
ternational law-ambassadors, vice-consuls, and foreign citizens-and
the admiralty and maritime clauses covered most of the remaining in-
ternational legal matters.4
The implementing legislation of Article III, namely the Judiciary
Act of 1789, detailed the scope of lower federal court jurisdiction in
this arena.5 Under the Act, an important statutory component-one
which serves as the focus of this Article's analysis-was Section 9,
commonly referred to as the Alien Torts Claims Act (ATCA).' The
ATCA, now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350, provides that "district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or treaty of the
United States." 7
Until recently, the ATCA was seldom invoked as a basis for federal
jurisdiction.8 Not until the modern, post-Nuremberg conception of
The framers of the Constitution knew that a nation could not maintain an
honorable place amongst the nations of the world that does not regard the
great and essential principles of the law of nations as a part of the law of the
land. Hence Congress may define those laws, but cannot abrogate them ....
That the laws of nations constitute a part of the laws of the land is estab-
lished from the face of the Constitution, upon principle and by authority.
Id; Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the
United States, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 26, 55-56 (1952) ("[Tlhe Constitution was framed in
firm reliance upon the premise, frequently articulated, that ... the Law of Nations in
all its aspects familiar to men of learning in the eighteenth century was accepted by
the framers, expressly or implicitly, as a constituent part of the national law of the
United States.").
4. See Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42
Vand. L. Rev. 819, 830, (1989) ("[Tlhe final version of that section did not include a
specific reference to the law of nations, but rather parceled matters dealing with the
law of nations into the separate categories of jurisdiction now appearing in Article
III."); see also id. at 830-32 (arguing against Professor Arthur Weisburd's view that
Article III's failure to specify law of nations as separate category signifies its not being
part of "the laws of the United States").
5. See Anthony D'Amato, The Alien Tort Statute and the Founding of tie Consti-
tution, 82 Am. J. Int'l L. 62, 62 (1988) (describing the Judiciary Act as "the structural
statutory law of the new nation" and, with the Constitution, part of the "organic laws"
of the Founding). To emphasize its legal weight, acts of the First Congress-the Judi-
ciary Act, especially-might be thought to occupy a middle ground between higher
and normal lawmaking under the Ackermanian model. See Bruce Ackerman, We The
People: Vol. 1, Foundations (1991).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
7. Id.
8. Scholars have posited different theories for the initial paucity of ATCA claims.
Anthony D'Amato submits that "[tlhe reason the Alien Tort Statute is comparatively
obscure today is that it worked." D'Amato, supra note 5, at 65 (discussing ATCA
purpose of making available impartial federal judiciary for potential international dis-
putes). The fact that Article III already covered most, if not all, of the juridical issues
and subjects of international law that could be involved in an ATCA suit may offer an
additional clue to solving this puzzle. See also Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort
Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 Am. J. Int'l L 461,470-71
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the law of nations could an ATCA suit conceivably be filed by an
individual for a violation of international human rights.9 The break-
through ATCA case was the 1980 decision, Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala.'
In Filartiga, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that
official torture violates the law of nations, and, therefore, a noncitizen
could bring suit against an alleged torturer under the ATCA. 11 After
an initially ambivalent reception, the Second Circuit's decision soon
attained a strong and diverse following. Adherents to Filartiga's legal
principles included other federal courts,'2 the Executive Branch, 3 the
American Law Institute,' 4 and the American Bar Association. 5 In
the legal academy, Filartiga met with a similarly warm reception. A
body of scholarship emerged approving of Filartiga's modern applica-
tion of the ATCA.' 6
(1989) (discussing both Article III and the Judiciary Act's allocation of federal juris-
diction to same issues and party structure as that covered by ATCA). TWo other
factors help explain the lack of suits. First, under the law of nations wing, the set of
persons who could claim a law of nations violation-which only governed relations
between states-was highly limited. Second, under the treaty wing, only a few trea-
ties could apply. As Professor Randall notes, at the time of the ATCA's enactment,
only fifteen treaties were in force. Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over In-
ternational Law Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. &
Pol. 1, 46 (1985).
9. See Mark W. Janis, An Introduction to International Law 235-40, 245-49
(1993); Rosalyn Higgins, Conceptual Thinking About the Individual in International
Law, 24 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 11, 21-22 (1978); Louis B. Sohn, The New International
Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 Am. U. L. Rev. 1,
1-16 (1982); Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political
Transformation, 106 Yale L.J. 2009, 2038 (1997) (discussing Nuremberg as a
"[p]aradigm shift").
10. 630 F.2d 876 (2d. Cir. 1980). Filartiga has aptly been termed the "Brown v.
Board of Education" of domestic human rights litigation. Harold Hongju Koh, Trans-
national Public Law Litigation, 100 Yale L.J. 2347, 2366 (1991); see also Richard B.
Lillich, Invoking International Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 367, 397 (1985) (describing Filartiga as "a major breakthrough in the use of cus-
tomary international human rights law").
11. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876. Dr. Joel Filartiga and his daughter Dolly Filartiga
sued a Paraguayan Inspector General of Police for having kidnapped and tortured to
death Dr. Filartiga's seventeen-year old son. Id. at 878. The Filartigas filed suit, hav-
ing discovered that they could establish personal jurisdiction to serve Inspector Gen-
eral Pena, who had emigrated and was residing in Brooklyn, New York. Id. at 878-79.
12. See infra Part II.C (discussing agreement in several circuits with Filartiga
decision).
13. Statement of Interest of the United States, Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d.
Cir. 1995) (on file with the Fordham Law Review); Memorandum for the United
States as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585 (1980).
14. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 703.7 (1987) [hereinafter Restatement (Third)]
15. The Torture Victim Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1417 Before the Sub-
comm. on Human Rights and Int'l Org. of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th
Cong. 5-10 (1988) (statement of Father Robert Drinan, on behalf of American Bar
Association); see also id. at 34-37 (statement of Alice Henkin, Chair, Committee on
International Human Rights, Association of the Bar of City of N.Y.).
16. See Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction Over Interna-
tional Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
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In 1984, however, this growing consensus was temporarily disturbed
by Judge Robert Bork in a decision of the Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit. In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,t7 three concurring
opinions reached the same result-the rejection of an ATCA claim-
for different reasons.'" Judge Bork's concurrence, in particular,
aroused concern because of its denial of a contemporary cause of ac-
tion under the statute. 19 The first-generation of ATCA scholars re-
sponded in force, directly disputing Judge Bork's historical accuracy
and method of statutory interpretation.2 0 This response, combined
with the efforts of practitioners in the field, ultimately succeeded in
winning both judicial and legislative support. In the judicial arena,
other circuits chose to follow the Filartiga line,2t either implicitly or
22 Harv. Int'l L.J. 53, 98-103 (1981); Kathryn Burke, et al., Application of Interna-
tional Human Rights Law in State and Federal Courts, 18 Tex. Int'l L-J. 291, 321
(1983); Lillich, supra note 10, at 397-401; Symposium: Federal Jurisdiction, Human
Rights, and the Law of Nations: Essays on Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 11 Ga. J. Int'l &
Comp. L. 305 (1981); Symposium: Integrating International Hunan Rights Law Into
Domestic Law-U.S. Experience, 4 Hous. J. Int'l L 1 (1981).
17. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
18. Id. at 823 (Bork, J., concurring) ("[T]he three opinions we have produced can
only add to the confusion surrounding this subject. The meaning and application of
section 1350 will have to await clarification elsewhere .... [i]t is impossible to say
even what the law of this circuit is.").
19. Id. at 801 ("[Ilt is essential that there be an explicit grant of a cause of action
before a private plaintiff [can] be allowed to enforce principles of international law in
a federal tribunal.").
20. See David Cole, et al., Interpreting tie Alien Tort Statue: Amicus Curiae Memo-
randum of International Law Scholars and Practitioners in Trajano v. Marcos, 12 Has-
tings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1 (1988) (reprint of amicus brief signed by 19
international law scholars and practitioners); Anthony D'Amato, What Does Tel-Oren
Tell Lawyers?: Judge Bork's Concept of the Law of Nations is Seriously Mistaken, 79
Am. J. Int'l L. 92 (1985); William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort
Statute: A Response to the "Originalists," 19 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L Rev. 221,237-
39 (1996); Kenneth C. Randall, Further Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute and a
Recommendation, 18 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 473,479-88 (1986); Laura Wishik, Sepa-
ration of Powers and Adjudication of Human Rights Claims Under the Alien Tort
Claims Act-Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 60 Wash. L Rev. 697, 697
(1985); Helen C. Lucas, Comment, The Adjudication of Violations of International
Law under the Alien Tort Claims Act: Allowing Alien Plaintiffs Their Day in Federal
Court, 36 DePaul L. Rev. 231,232 (1987); Virginia A. Melvin, Comment, Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic: Redefining the Alien Tort Claims Act, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 211,
213-14 (1985); Andrew M. Scoble, Comment, Enforcing the Customary International
Law of Human Rights in Federal Court, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 127 (1986); Michael C. Small,
Note, Enforcing International Human Rights Law in Federal Courts: The Alien Tort
Statute and the Separation of Powers, 74 Geo. L.J. 163 (1985).
21. See Michael Ratner & Beth Stephens, Tyrants, Terrorists and Torturers
Brought to Justice; U.S. Courts Provide Compensation for Victim, N.Y. L.J., May 15,
1995, at S5 ("As of this writing, Judge Bork's opinion is the only judicial opinion
calling Filartiga into question. Since then every decision has supported the result
reached in Filartiga; most have awarded substantial damages."). A partial list of deci-
sions embracing Filartiga includes: Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 846-47 (11th
Cir. 1996); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
2524 (1996); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467,
1473, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, Human Rights Litig.,
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explicitly repudiating Judge Bork's position."2 And, in the legislative
arena, Congress enacted the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA)2 3
in order to strengthen and clarify the ATCA in a manner which effec-
tively overruled Judge Bork's opinion. Filartiga's success seemed
complete.
A recent challenge, however, has emerged. A handful of law re-
view articles have cast new doubt on the Filartiga doctrine. Specifi-
cally, Professors Curtis Bradley, Jack Goldsmith, and Arthur
Weisburd now argue for a radical rethinking of the Filartiga line.24
These scholars claim that the Filartiga court's reasoning relies upon a
flawed assumption that customary international law ("CIL") is federal
common law and, as such, is actionable in U.S. federal courts.25
Although troubled by Filartiga's understanding of CIL's status in
domestic law, these scholars do not begin, but rather conclude, their
analysis by considering the impact their reformulation has on Filartiga
and its progeny. They begin their project, more broadly, with a
sweeping reconsideration of "a well-entrenched component of U.S.
foreign relations law:"2 6 the conventional view that "customary inter-
national law [] is part of this country's post-Erie federal common
law."2 7 As a replacement for this conventional wisdom-what Brad-
ley and Goldsmith call the "modern position"-they offer a funda-
mental reformulation.2" That is, their position-which we call the
978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th Cir. 1992); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362,
370 (E.D. La. 1997); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 193 (D. Mass. 1995); Paul
v. Avril, 901 F. Supp. 330 (S.D. Fla. 1994); United States v. Schiffer, 836 F. Supp. 1164,
1170 (E.D. Pa. 1993), affd mem., 31 F.3d 1175 (3d Cir. 1994); Forti v. Suarez-Mason,
672 F. Supp. 1531, 1544 (N.D. Cal. 1987), reh'g granted on other grounds, 694 F. Supp.
707 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 798 (D. Kan. 1980),
affd on other grounds, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981). Notably, one of Judge Bork's
co-paneists in Tel-Oren followed Filartiga's reasoning. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan-Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 776-77 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring).
22. See, e.g., Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1539 (specifically rejecting Judge Bork's posi-
tion and noting "growing consensus that § 1350 provides a cause of action for certain
international common law torts").
23. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1992, Pub.L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992),
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
24. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of
Human Rights Litigation, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 319 (1997) [hereinafter Human Rights
Litigation]; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815
(1997) [hereinafter Customary International Law]; A.M. Weisburd, The Executive
Branch and International Law, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 1205 (1988) [hereinafter Weisburd,
Executive Branch]; A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International
Cases, 20 Yale J. Int'l L. 1 (1995) [hereinafter State Courts]; cf. Phillip R. Trimble, A
Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 665 (1986).
25. Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24, at 833-34.
26. Id. at 816.
27. Id. (footnote omitted).
28. The acceptance of the modern position is widespread: "During the last twenty
years, almost every federal court that has considered the modern position has en-
dorsed it. Indeed, several courts have referred to it as 'settled.' The modern position
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"revisionist position"-offers a radically new default rule: "[I]n the
absence of federal political branch authorization, CIL is not a source
of federal law."29
This Article analyzes the implications of the revisionist project for
the Filartiga doctrine.30 We advance two related arguments: (1) Fed-
eral courts and the political branches explicitly endorse the view that,
at a minimum, the scope of CIL is a federal matter; and (2) the courts
and political branches also explicitly endorse the view that some de-
finable categories of CIL-including fundamental, universally-recog-
nized human rights-are federal common law. Our argument is
simple: The consensus view that universally-recognized human rights
are federal common law reflects the considered judgment of the three
coordinate branches of government.
The Filartiga doctrine offers a productive site for testing the revi-
sionist model. Locating the discussion in actual practice provides salu-
tary conditions for evaluating the critique of the modern position.
Discussions of federal common law, in particular, are better informed
by an appreciation of prevailing judicial practices and restraints 1 In
also has the overwhelming approval of the academy." Id. at 816-17 (footnotes
omitted).
29. Id. at 870; id. at 868 ("CIL is never supreme federal law in the absence of some
authorization from the federal political branches.").
30. The revisionist position is vulnerable on several fronts; we will explore only
one approach. In this sense, our argument is meant to complement the work of
Professors Gerald Neuman and Beth Stephens. See Gerald L Neuman, Sense and
Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith, 66 Ford. L. Rev. 371 (1997); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Cus-
tomary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 Ford. L Rev. 393 (1997). In
his trenchant critique of the revisionist position, Professor Neuman convincingly ar-
gues that: "The existence and content of rules of customary international law that are
binding on the United States is to be determined as a matter of federal law. Such
rules are presumptively incorporated into the U.S. domestic legal system and given
effect as rules of federal law." Neuman, supra, at 376 (footnote omitted). Professor
Neuman thus provides a systematic defense of the conceptual foundations of the
modem position. Beth Stephens offers a comprehensive defense of the modern pos-
tion rooted in the "complex role international law has played in our legal system for
over two hundred years." (emphasis added) Stephens, supra, at 397. Stephens's
nuanced historical account underscores several gaps in the revisionist position. Our
Article, in contrast, offers a critique of the modem position grounded in contempo-
rary judicial and congressional practice. Unlike Neuman and Stephens, we accept, for
the sake of argument, the revisionist default rule.
31. As Professor Martha Field counsels:
In discussions of federal common law, .. . alarms are often raised about how
far courts could go-alarms similar to those raised concerning Congress's
power unlimited by any Tenth Amendment restraints. But in the situation of
federal common law as well, it is important to recognize that the opportunity
has not been pursued. Courts have shied away from wielding the power that
in theory has been left to them.
Martha A. Field, The Legitimacy of Federal Common Law, 12 Pace L Rev. 303, 304
(1992) [hereinafter Field, Legitimacy]. As a side note, perhaps one of the best exam-
ples of the salutary characteristics of common law is the common law of judicial
restraint.
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sum, evaluating the emergent critiques of CIL's incorporation into
federal common law has no better practical test site than the Filartiga
line-"the archetypal case of the modern genre of human rights
claims."32
In part I, by way of introduction, we outline the modern position
and the revisionist challenge. In part II, we describe and discuss the
modern litigation under the Filartiga line of cases. We argue that Fi-
lartiga properly followed the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on post-
Erie federal common law. We also examine the modern litigation in
order to provide a foundation for assessing the actual implications and
effects of the modern position. In part III, we argue that the TVPA,
enacted in 1992, completely insulates the Filartiga line from the revi-
sionist challenge. We also take the position that the TVPA legislative
history provides strong evidence of congressional approval of CIL's
status as federal common law. While this Article principally attends
to specifics of the Filartiga doctrine, in our conclusion, we suggest
broader implications of our analysis for the revisionist position.
I. FRAMING THE DEBATE: THE REVISIONIST CHALLENGE TO THE
MODERN POSITION
For most of the nation's history, CIL-or the "law of nations"-was
indisputably part of the general common law.33 In Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins, 4 however, the Supreme Court declared an end to gen-
eral federal common law, holding that "[e]xcept in matters governed
by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be
applied in any case is the law of the State."35 Therefore, Erie implic-
itly classifies all law applied in federal courts as either state or federal
law.36 Although Erie did not invalidate all federal common law-mak-
32. Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Questions and the Human Rights Paradigm, 73
Minn. L. Rev. 349, 360 n.49 (1988).
33. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, federal courts routinely ap-
plied "general common law" in the absence of congressional authorization. See Wil-
liam A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of
1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1513, 1517-21 (1984); see
also id. at 1517 ("[The general common law] existed by common practice and consent
among a number of sovereigns .... The American courts resorted to [it] to provide
the rules of decision in particular cases without insisting that the law be attached to
any particular sovereign."); Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part 71vo,
133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1231, 1263-79 (1985).
34. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
35. Id. at 78. The Court's language mirrors the language of the Rules of Decision
Act. The Rules of Decision Act provides: "The laws of the several states, except
where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts
of the United States, in cases where they apply." 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994).
36. See Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 805, 820
(1989) ("At the heart of [Erie] was the positivistic insight that American law must be
either federal law or state law. There could be no overarching or hybrid third
option.").
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ing authority,37 the Court left unexplored the precise contours of fed-
eral common law.3" As a consequence, the proper meaning and scope
of federal common law has been the subject of much debate.39 The
37. Erie did not put an end to all federal common law. To the contrary, in Hinder-
lider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938), decided the
same day as Erie, the Court applied a federal common law rule regarding interstate
water disputes. The Hinderlider Court-holding that federal law should govern the
dispute-recharacterized a general common law rule as a federal common law rule.
See id at 110 (relying on general common law applied in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S.
46, 95-98 (1907)); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 331-64 (2d ed.
1994) (detailing the post-Erie development of federal common law in various areas);
Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of tie New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383 (1964) (describing the rise of post-Erie federal common law in-
volving federal interests).
38. Scholarship attempting to fill this gap is abundant. Significant academic writ-
ings on federal common law include George D. Brown, Federal Common Law and
The Role of the Federal Courts in Private Law Adjudication-A (New) Erie Problem?,
12 Pace L. Rev. 229 (1992) (discussing Erie and its connection to federal courts'
power to formulate federal substantive common law); Bradford R. Clark, Federal
Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. Pa. L Rev. 1245, 1271-1311
(1996) (proposing an approach for reconceptualizing federal common law in accord-
ance with constitutional structure); Field, Legitimacy, supra note 31, at 304-05 (claim-
ing that federal common law is functionally limited only by judicial restraint); Martha
A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 Harv. L Rev. 883,
887 (1986) [hereinafter Field, Sources of Law] (same); Friendly, supra note 37, at
383 (arguing that Erie ushered in an era of new federal common law involving issues
of national importance); Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts,
12 Pace L. Rev. 263 (1992) (defending broad view of federal common law-making
power while insisting on definite limits to its exercise); Thomas W. Merrill, The Com-
mon Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1985) [hereinafter Merrill,
Common Law Powers] (proposing four principles limiting federal common law pow-
ers); Thomas W. Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative, 12 Pace L Rev. 327 (1992) (discuss-
ing whether separation of powers principles in the Constitution allow federal courts to
fashion federal common law). See also Martin H. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Ten-
sions in the Allocation of Judicial Power ch. 4 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter Redish, Ten-
sions] (evaluating possible sources of the federal common law making authority).
39. See supra note 38. Discussions of federal common law often include some
dispute over the meaning of "federal common law." Generally, federal common law
refers to federal rules of decision fashioned in the absence of express political branch
authorization. For other definitions, see Brown, supra note 38, at 230-31 (defining
federal common law as "any rule of federal law created by a court (usually but not
invariably a federal court)" pertaining to substantive matters, but not to jurisdictional
or procedural matters); Field, Sources of Law, supra note 38, at 890 (defining fed-
eral common law as "any rule of federal law created by a court ... when the substance
of that rule is not clearly suggested by federal enactments" (emphasis in original));
Kramer, supra note 38, at 267-69 (defining federal common law as including "any rule
articulated by a court that is not easily found on the face of an applicable statute");
Merrill, Common Law Powers, supra note 38, at 7 (defining federal common law as
substantive or procedural federal rules "not found on the face of an authoritative
federal text"). Many commentators note the striking similarities between common
law and statutory interpretation. See Brown, supra note 38, at 231 (arguing that fed-
eral common law making and statutory interpretation are similar but distinguishable);
Kramer, supra note 38, at 267-69 (explaining that "interpretation shades impercepti-
bly into judicial lawmaking"); Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Le-
gitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 761,794 (1989) ("[V]hile gray areas will appear, it should not be all that difficult
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sweep of this debate has not however, until recently, included disputes
over the status of CIL-international law norms not explicitly incor-
porated into any federal statute or treaty-as federal common law.40
The consensus view, which Professors Bradley and Goldsmith call the
"modern position,"4 1 has maintained that CIL is part of the post-Erie
federal common law. The emergent challenge to the modern position,
which we call the "revisionist position," questions the foundations of
this view and claims that this consensus "is the result of a combination
of troubling developments, including mistaken interpretations of his-
tory, doctrinal bootstrapping by the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law, and academic fiat."4 The revisionist critique of the
modern position culminates in a proposed default rule for the incor-
poration of CIL as federal law: "[I]n the absence of federal political
branch authorization, CIL is not a source of federal law."43
A. The Modern Position
The modern position maintains that CIL is federal common law.44
After Erie, CIL is clearly not part of the general common law; leaving
open the question: What is the post-Erie status of CIL in U.S. law?
Although not explicitly analyzing CIL's status in domestic law, Erie's
holding suggests two possibilities: state law or federal common law.45
In the period between Erie and the Supreme Court's decision in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,4 6 courts47 and commentators
48
to distinguish permissible true statutory 'interpretation' from prohibited creative judi-
cial law making." (footnote omitted)); Weinberg, supra note 36, at 807 (claiming that
there is "no useful theoretical dividing line" between common law and statutory
interpretation).
40. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24, at
817-22.
41. See id. at 816 n.2. Bradley and Goldsmith write:
We use the term 'modern' to signify that widespread endorsement of this
view occurred only recently. We use the term 'position' to signify that there
is substantial agreement that CIL has the status of federal common law, not
to signify that all those who adopt this position are in agreement regarding
its rationales or implications.
Id.
42. Id. at 821.
43. Id. at 870.
44. See infra note 53.
45. But see Weisburd, State Courts, supra note 24, at 48-51 (claiming that CIL
should be considered neither state nor federal law).
46. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
47. Only one federal court directly addressed the post-Erie status of CIL. See
Bergman v. De Sieyes, 170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948) (applying state court's interpreta-
tion of international law). The court did, however, qualify its holding in language that
presaged the Supreme Court's reasoning in Sabbatino. See id. at 361 ("Whether an
avowed refusal to accept a well-established doctrine of international law, or a plain
misapprehension of it, would present a federal question we need not consider, for
neither is present here.").
48. 'Two prominient scholars advocated the modern position in this period. See
Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United
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provided little guidance on the issue. In Sabbatino, the Supreme
Court-quoting Judge Jessup's warning that Erie should not apply to
international lawn--clearly announced "foreign affairs" as an enclave
of federal common law .50 Many commentators suggested that the
holding in Sabbatino-the most on point post-Erie Supreme Court
opinion discussing the federal common law status of transnational
legal issues-implicitly supported the modern position.5
The Court's holding in Sabbatino was the precursor to what Profes-
sors Bradley and Goldsmith call the "twin pillars"52 of the modem
position: Filartiga and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law. In Filartiga, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that non-
diverse applications of § 1350, the Alien Tort Claims Act, do not vio-
late Article III of the Constitution since CIL is part of the federal
common law.53 The American Law Institute, in the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law, also unambiguously endorsed the
modem position that CIL is federal common law.- Partially as a re-
sult of these developments, a consensus developed among commenta-
States, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 26,49 (1952) (arguing from an historical perspective that the
"law of nations" is post-Erie federal law); Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Rail-
road v. Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 Am. J. Int'l L 740 (1939) (arguing
that international law is post-Erie federal law).
49. See Jessup, supra note 48, at 741.
50. 376 U.S. at 425-27; see also infra Parts II.A & IV.A.
51. See Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution 223 (1972); Rich-
ard A. Falk, The Complexity of Sabbatino, 58 Am. J. Int'l L 935, 948-49 (1964); Al-
fred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67
Colum. L. Rev. 1024, 1042-68 (1967); Note, Federal Common Law and Article 111: A
Jurisdictional Approach to Erie, 74 Yale L.J. 325, 335-37 (1964).
52. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24, at 849.
We also claim that the TVPA is properly understood as a "third pillar" of the modern
position. See infra Part III.
53. See F'lartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876. 887 n.20 (2d Cir. 1980)
("[I]nternational law has an existence in the federal courts independent of acts of
Congress .... "); id. at 885 ("[T]he law of nations ... has always been part of the
federal common law." (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) and The
Neireide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388,422 (1815))). Bradley and Goldsmith offer an expla-
nation of the importance of the Filartiga court's holding that CIL is federal common
law:
Filartiga is significant for present purposes because of its ... holding con-
cerning the constitutionality of the ATS .... [T]he Article III basis for
federal jurisdiction in Filartiga was questionable. The parties were not di-
verse, and the case did not arise under either a treaty or a federal statute.
But there was another possibility, for federal question jurisdiction also ex-
tends to cases that arise under federal common law.
Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24, at 833 (citations
omitted).
54. See Restatement (Third), supra note 14, at § 111 cmt. d, § 115 cmt. e; id. at
§ 111 reporter's note 3 ("Based on the implications of Sabbatino, the modern %iew is
that customary international law in the United States is federal law and its determina-
tion by the federal courts is binding on the State courts.").
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tors55 and courts56 that CIL is a post-Erie enclave57 of federal common
law. That is, in the last twenty years, the modem position has become
the consensus view.
55. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24, at 817
("The modern position... has the overwhelming approval of the academy."). The
modem position is indeed widely endorsed in the legal academy. See, e.g., Restate-
ment (Third), supra note 14, § 111 cmt. d, § 115 cmt. e; Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs
and the United States Constitution 236-46 (2d ed. 1996); Jordan J. Paust, Interna-
tional Law as Law of the United States 6-7 (1996); Anne Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick,
International Human Rights Law in United States Courts: A Comparative Perspective,
14 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1, 3-27 (1992); Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 16, at 98-102; Lea
Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of International
Law, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 295, 295, 302-04; Jorge Cicero, The Alien Tort Statute of 1789
as a Remedy for Injuries to Foreign Nationals Hosted by the United States, 23 Colum.
Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 315, 340-58 (1992); Clyde H. Crockett, The Role of Federal Com-
mon Law in Alien Tort Statute Cases, 14 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 29, 40-41 (1991);
Gregory H. Fox, Reexamining the Act of State Doctrine: An Integrated Conflicts Anal-
ysis, 33 Harv. Int'l L.J. 521, 567-69 (1992); Michael J. Glennon, Raising The Paquete
Habana: Is Violation of Customary International Law by the Executive Unconstitu-
tional?, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 321, 325, 343-53 (1985); Louis Henkin, The Constitution
and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100
Harv. L. Rev. 853, 875-76 (1987) [hereinafter Henkin, Chinese Exclusion]; Louis Hen-
kin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1555, 1560-61
(1984); Louis Henkin, The President and International Law, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 930,
932-34 (1986) [hereinafter Henkin, The President and International Law]; Koh, supra
note 10, at 2385-86; Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Be-
tween Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 Va. L. Rev. 1071, 1075, 1179-80 (1985);
Randall, supra note 32, at 388-93; Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under
International Law, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 785, 785-91 (1988); Ralph G. Steinhardt, Fulfilling
the Promise of Filartiga: Litigating Human Rights Claims Against the Estate of Ferdi-
nand Marcos, 20 Yale J. Int'l L. 65, 77-79, 98-101 (1995); Note, Judicial Enforcement
of International Law Against the Federal and State Governments, 104 Harv. L. Rev.
1269, 1270-71, 1287-88 (1991).
56. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24, at 817
("[Almost every federal court that has considered the modem position has endorsed
it."); see, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995) (describing the "set-
tled proposition that federal common law incorporates international law"), cert. de-
nied, 116 S. Ct. 2524 (1996); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig.,
25 F.3d 1467, 1473, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, Human
Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th Cir. 1992) ("It is ... well settled that the law of
nations is part of federal common law."); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d
Cir. 1980); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 193 (D. Mass. 1995) ("It is well
settled that the body of principles that comprise customary international law is sub-
sumed and incorporated by federal common law."); United States v. Schiffer, 836 F.
Supp. 1164, 1170 (E.D. Pa. 1993), affid mem., 31 F.3d 1175 (3d Cir. 1994); Forti v.
Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1544 (N.D. Cal. 1987), reh'g granted on other
grounds, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787,
798 (D. Kan. 1980), affd on other grounds, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
57. Federal common law making authority is often described in terms of "en-
claves." See, e.g., Redish, Tensions, supra note 38, at 125-48 (describing "areas" of
federal common law making authority). Several commentators are critical of this ap-
proach. See, e.g., Weinberg, Federal Common Law, supra note 36, at 812 ("We will not
be misled by lists of 'federal enclaves' chronically offered by courts and writers, lists of
discrete topics upon which the nation's lawmaking power is supposedly confined in its
courts." (footnotes omitted)).
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The "collateral" doctrinal consequences 58 of the modem position
remain less obvious. Clearly, federal interpretations of CIL preempt
inconsistent state law under the Supremacy Clause.59 Additionally,
federal court jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution would
extend to cases "arising under" CIL.60 Other potential doctrinal con-
sequences include: (1) Federal CIL may bind the President under the
Take Care Clause;6' and (2) federal CIL may supersede prior incon-
sistent federal statutes.62 These potential doctrinal implications do
not, however, necessarily follow from the modern position. First, no
federal court endorsing the modern position has endorsed these appli-
cations of the modem position.63 Second, and more important, the
political branches retain the capacity to qualify the incorporation of
CIL into federal common law through executive orders, treaties, or
federal legislation. Third, not all federal CIL is actionable in federal
courts.' 4 As we argue below, actionable federal CIL is limited to uni-
versal norms, such as torture and extrajudicial killing. Therefore, only
universally recognized CIL might be enforceable against the U.S. fed-
eral government.
58. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24, at 834.
59. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 ("Laws of the United States ... shall be the
supreme Law of the Land."); see also Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S.
500, 504 (1988) (reciting that "a few areas, involving 'uniquely federal interests,' are
so committed by the Constitution and laws of the United States to federal control that
state law is pre-empted and replaced, where necessary, by federal law of a content
prescribed ... by the courts-so-called 'federal common law"' (citation omitted));
Merrill, Common Law Powers, supra note 38, at 6-7 ("Federal common law ... is
federal law. Consequently, the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of its content, and
the resulting rules are binding on the state courts under the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution."); Brilmayer, supra note 55, at 342.
60. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases
... arising under... the Laws of the United States .... ").
61. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 ("[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed .... "). Some advocates of the modem position defend this view.
See, eg., Henkin, The President and International Law, supra note 55, at 934-36; Glen-
non, supra note 55, at 332.
62. See, eg., Henkin, Chinese Exclusion, supra note 55, at 875-78 (advocating a
last-in-time rule).
63. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24, at 821,
838-48. Professors Bradley and Goldsmith maintain that federal courts have consid-
ered the modem position only in "jurisdictional contexts," and as such, these courts
have not had the occasion to evaluate the full doctrinal implications of the modem
position. See id at 821. We disagree. Indeed, as Bradley and Goldsmith point out,
federal courts have upheld the constitutionality of § 1350 by finding that CIL-as a
matter of substantive law-is part of the laws of the United States for the purposes of
Article III. See id. at 833-34.
64. See infra Parts II, III.A, & IV (arguing that only universally recognized CIL is
actionable in U.S. courts).
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B. The Revisionist Challenge
The revisionists challenge the "well-entrenched" proposition that
CIL is federal law.65 The revisionist position engages the modern po-
sition along two axes. First, the revisionists dispute the foundations,
or "pillars," of the modern position, and second, the revisionists sug-
gest that the values of democracy, separation of powers, and federal-
ism counsel against the modern position. Motivated by these concerns
the revisionists fashion a new default rule governing the incorporation
of CIL into federal law.
The revisionists scrutinize and reject the "twin pillars" of the mod-
ern position. First, the revisionists reject the Second Circuit's holding
in Filartiga.66 According to the revisionist approach, the Filartiga
court's reliance on pre-Erie precedents is unwarranted and inconclu-
sive.67 The revisionists claim that nineteenth-century case law cannot
support the finding that CIL is federal common law. The oft-quoted
passages from The Paquete Habana61 and The Nereide69 stand only for
the proposition that CIL was part of the pre-Erie general common
law.7" Filartiga's reliance on these cases to support its finding that
CIL is part of the post-Erie federal common law is misplaced since
these cases can offer no such support for that conclusion.
The revisionists also maintain that The Restatement (Third) of For-
eign Relations Law fails to document its conclusion that CIL had as-
sumed the status of federal law.71 According to the revisionist view,
the only case supporting the modern position before the release of the
draft Restatement (Third) was Filartiga.7" As such, the revisionists
conclude that the Restatement (Third) provides no independent sup-
port for the modern position.73
Additionally, the revisionists claim that the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Sabbatino provides no basis for the modern position. 74 In sup-
port of this claim, the revisionists offer an alternative reading of the
Court's reasoning in Sabbatino. According to the revisionist view, the
Sabbatino Court's holding stands only for the proposition that courts
lack the institutional competence to adjudicate matters relating to for-
65. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24, at 816.
66. See id. at 831-34; Weisburd, State Courts, supra note 24, at 28-37.
67. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24, at 834.
68. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of
our law ... ").
69. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815) (stating that the "law of na-
tions" is the "law of the land").
70. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24, at 834.
71. See id. at 834-37.
72. See id. at 836.
73. See id. at 837-38.
74. See id. at 859-60; Weisburd, State Courts, supra note 24, at 43-44; Weisburd,
Executive Branch, supra note 24, at 1241.
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eign affairs.7 5 In their view, the Court's reasoning turns on separation
of powers concerns rather than concerns about the federal law status
of CR. 7 6 As such, the revisionists maintain that the Sabbatino Court
fashioned a federal common law of judicial restraint, rather than a
"federal common law of foreign relations." 77
The revisionist position not only disputes the modern position's
doctrinal underpinnings, but also questions the modern position's
broader implications. In evaluating the potential implications of the
modem position, the revisionists highlight the changing nature and
role of CIL.
Two concerns structure their approach. First, the revisionists la-
ment the fact that international law increasingly purports to regulate
"many areas that were formerly of exclusive domestic concern. ''T
Second, the revisionists describe the "new CIL,"' "7 as governing an
ever-broadening range of juridical relationships,'m emerging quickly,,"
and far less consent-based than traditional CIL.' That is, the revi-
sionists warn against the federalization of a body of law that regulates
a broad range of public and private action and develops without the
input of U.S. political branches.
Thus, the revisionists conclude that the changing nature of CIL gen-
erates many disturbing doctrinal implications of the modern position:
(1) Federal CIL would preempt an increasingly (and unacceptably)
broad range of state laws; 3 (2) federal CIL would involve federal
75. See Bradley & Goldsmith, C'ustomary International Law, supra note 24, at 829-
30; Weisburd, State Courts, supra note 24, at 44; Weisburd, Executive Branch, supra
note 24, at 1241-42.
76. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Custonary International Law, supra note 24, at 859-
60; Weisburd, State Courts, supra note 24, at 44; Weisburd, Erecutive Branch, supra
note 24, at 1240-42.
77. See Bradley & Goldsmith, C'ustomnary International Law, supra note 24, at 860.
78. Id. at 821.
79. See id at 838-42.
80. See id at 839-40.
81. See id at 840-41.
82. See id at 839-40.
83. See id. at 846-47. This argument is not new to federal common law scholars.
Indeed, broad-based limitations on the federal common law making authority are
often fashioned to vindicate federalism. As such, federalism concerns pervade federal
common law scholarship. See Kramer, supra note 38, at 290-92 (explaining federalism-
based objection to federal common law); id. at 300 ("[T]o the extent that federal
common law is made to improve the effectiveness of a federal statute, the states have
a weaker objection than when Congress has not acted."). Professor Lund argues:
[F]ederalism-based objections are overcome when Congress, having deter-
mined that federal regulation is necessary, has acted to federalize an area of
the law. States presumably have had their say in the congressional debate.
It is within federal judicial power to fashion federal rules of decision neces-
sary to make the federal statute or program work.
Paul Lund, The Decline of Federal COnmon La-., 76 B.U. L Rev. 895, 1004 (1996)
(citations omitted); see also Merrill, Common Law Powers, supra note 38, at 18 (argu-




courts in issues best left to the political branches;84 and (3) federal
CIL would potentially invalidate democratically-produced U.S. polit-
ical branch action with which it is inconsistent. 85 These concerns, ac-
cording to the revisionist approach, counsel against the wholesale
incorporation of CIL into federal common law. To avoid these doctri-
nal consequences, they suggest an alternative to the modern position;
a revisionist default rule governing the incorporation of CIL into U.S.
law: Absent political branch authorization, CIL is not federal law.86
The doctrinal implications of the revisionist position are no less set-
tled than those of the modern position. Professors Bradley and Gold-
smith suggest that the changes in current judicial practice would be
slight.87 Two doctrinal changes, however, merit closer scrutiny. First,
CIL-absent political branch authorization-would be subject to the
potentially divergent interpretations of the fifty states.88 Second, the
ongoing § 1350 litigation-the Filartiga line-might be adversely af-
fected.89 According to the revisionist account, Filartiga and its prog-
84. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24, at 844-
46. Professor Lund has summarized the "separation of powers" limitation on federal
common law:
Separation of powers principles also do not require a federal court to incor-
porate state law as the federal common law rule of decision. The separation
of powers arguments are of two types: first, that federal courts would be
intruding on federal legislative authority by creating their own federal rules
of law, and second, that federal courts lack the institutional competency to
"make law."
Lund, supra note 83 at 1008-09. Professor Lund goes on to reject the "separation of
powers" objection:
The typical case of federal common law making, in which the court must fill
a gap in a federal statutory scheme, involves no invasion of the law making
sphere reserved to Congress .... Sometimes Congress intentionally leaves
remedial gaps for the courts to fill; more commonly Congress failed to ad-
dress the question because the matter did not occur to Congress at the time
.... Whether the federal court looks for and adopts a supposedly analogous
state law rule to fill the gap, or instead tries to create a federal rule Congress
might have adopted, neither requires the court to enter the domain reserved
to Congress.
Lund, supra note 83, at 1009.
85. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24, at 857-
58, 868-69.
86. See id. at 868, 870; Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights Litigation, supra note
24, at 319.
87. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24, at 871-
74.
88. See Henkin, supra note 51, at 238 ("Fifty states could have fifty different views
on some issue of international law and the federal courts might have still another
view.").
89. Bradley and Goldsmith claim that the repudiation of the modern position
need not disturb the ongoing ATCA litigation:
[I]f CIL is not federal common law, then the Article III basis for federal
jurisdiction over suits involving only aliens-the large majority of interna-
tional human rights suits under the ATS-is suspect. But rejection of the
modern position would not necessarily spell the end for Filartiga-type litiga-
tion, for two reasons. First, there might be justifications other than the mod-
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eny have mistakenly relied upon the modern position in upholding
Article III constitutionality of alien-alien suits under § 1350 and in
fashioning federal CIL-based causes of action without congressional
authorization.90 Therefore, the revisionist position could potentially
have drastic implications for the Filartiga line. These potential ad-
verse consequences are the point of departure for our analysis.
The balance of this Article analyzes two related issues: the implica-
tions of the revisionist default rule for the Filartiga line;9 and the im-
plications of the Filartiga line for the revisionist project.' We
advance two related claims. First, the ongoing human rights litigation
under § 1350 is immune from the effects of the revisionist default rule.
Second, the nature of § 1350's immunity illustrates deep-seated defi-
ciencies in the revisionist project.
II. FEDERAL COURT ENDORSEMENT OF THE MODERN POSITION:
THE STRUcTURE OF THE MODERN LITIGATION
The structure of controlling case law lends little support to the revi-
sionist critique. In this part, we describe and analyze the modern posi-
tion in contemporary federal jurisprudence emphasizing the limits of
the judiciary's willingness to incorporate CIL as judicially cognizable
claims. This discussion allows us to consider the actual legal ramifica-
tions of the modem position. While the revisionist critique cautions
against the wholesale incorporation of CIL into federal common law,
this part demonstrates the nature of CIL norms that courts actually
em position for the constitutionality of the ATS. For example, one could
perhaps interpret the ATS's jurisdictional grant as authorizing federal courts
to create federal common law rules of tort liability in cases brought by aliens
based on the courts' interpretation of CIL; ATS cases would therefore arise
under this federal law for purposes of Article I1. Similarly, one could per-
haps interpret the ATS to create a federal cause of action and conclude that
claims brought pursuant to the ATS therefore "arise under" federal statu-
tory law. Some theory of "protective jurisdiction" might also support the
constitutionality of the statute. Second, and more importantly, Congress re-
tains the power to remedy any Article III problem by legislating human
rights norms into federal law. Indeed, Congress did precisely this with re-
spect to torture cases when it enacted the Torture Victim Protection Act.
Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24, at 872-73. These
alternative theories are unpersuasive. First, current federal court precedent relies
upon the modem position to uphold the constitutionality of nondiverse § 1350 suits.
The revisionist position requires federal courts to replace this well-developed body of
case law (see infra Part II) with speculative, undeveloped alternate theories. Second,
the revisionist default rule might radically alter the range of potential causes of action
in § 1350 cases. See infra Part III for an evaluation of this claim. Third, some of the
alternate theories simply do not work.
90. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24, at 871-
73.
91. See infra text accompanying notes 96-116.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 117-59.
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deem judicially cognizable as U.S. domestic law.93 Our position is eas-
ily summarized: First, federal courts have properly recognized that all
international law is presumptively a federal matter and, second, fed-
eral courts have elaborated a sound analytical framework limiting the
application of international law in U.S. courts. In short, the Filartiga
line of cases, following the Supreme Court's reasoning in Sabbatino,
appropriately fashions a federal common law of universal human
rights norms.
A. Sabbatino and CIL's Status as Federal Common Law
Filartiga fits neatly within the Supreme Court's federal common law
jurisprudence. Admittedly, the Filartiga court did not explicitly recon-
cile the ATCA with the post-Erie constraints on federal common law.
The prevailing view of Erie's non-applicability in foreign affairs cases,
however, removed such issues from the decisional calculus.94 The
Supreme Court had provided clear controlling precedent on the mat-
ter well after Erie's doctrinal shockwaves had reorganized the Court's
understanding of federal common law. We defend two related pro-
positions. First, Filartiga's finding that torture is actionable as federal
law flowed quite reasonably from the leading federal common law
case in foreign affairs, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.95 Sec-
ond, the Supreme Court's reasoning in Sabbatino provides broad sup-
port for the Filartiga court's claim that CIL is federal common law.
1. Delimiting the Courts' Role: Sabbatino's "Sliding Scale"
Sabbatino has informed the Filartiga doctrine in a pivotal way: Sab-
batino structures the federal courts' understanding of the scope of ac-
tionable CIL in U.S. courts. The Sabbatino Court's holding-that the
act of state doctrine prevents U.S. courts from examining the validity
of a foreign government's expropriations in the absence of a treaty or
other unambiguous agreement-has implicitly defined the boundaries
of actionable CIL under § 1350.
The issue in Sabbatino was whether the act of state doctrine pre-
cluded courts from determining if the Cuban government's expropria-
93. This comprehensive account of the case law should provide a practical under-
standing of the boundaries of Filartiga's doctrinal effect. This part's discussion should
also help alleviate concerns about the potential over-expansiveness of the federal
common law of CIL. Here, we discuss the distinction between CIL, in general, and its
more limited subset of actionable jus cogens violations. We also examine the exact
international law claims that are raised and the methods by which courts evaluate
them. This discussion analyzes the case law's built-in regulations that secure against
the revisionists' prognostications.
94. Discussing the applicability of federal common law would have been highly
unusual in a case like Filartiga. Such reasoning would have raised a non issue. In fact,
no dissent from the Filartiga line has ever argued that the ATCA presents Erie
difficulties.
95. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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tion of alien property violated international law." Justice Harlan,
writing for the majority, held first, that the act of state doctrine consti-
tuted a domain of federal common law97 and, second, that this doc-
trine prevented U.S. courts from examining the validity of a foreign
government's taking of property in the absence of a treaty or other
unambiguous agreement.9"
The Supreme Court fashioned a federal rule of decision to govern
the scope of judicial incorporation of international law. Both the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York and the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals had passed on the legal legitimacy of the
Cuban government's act of expropriation under international law"-
an unheralded move." 0 Both lower federal courts recognized that
courts of the United States must expound and develop international
law when it is appropriate to do so. 01 Not surprisingly, proponents of
the modern position initially viewed the outcome of the Supreme
Court case as a significant setback.10 2
The Sabbatino Court explained that the lower courts had erred be-
cause of the nature of private property expropriation-a principle of
international law over which countries of different political ideologies
could reasonably disagree.10 3 Indeed, questions over private property
and rights of governmental seizure were highly contentious issues on
the international plane."° Of no small relevance, the litigation was
set against the backdrop of a world deeply divided along communist
96. 1& at 400-01.
97. Id. at 425.
98. Id. at 428.
99. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962): Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
100. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. at 380 ("Apparently, no court in this country has
passed on the question.").
101. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d at 861 ("[U]ntil the day of capable international adjudica-
tion among countries, the municipal courts must be the custodians of the concepts of
international law, and they must expound, apply and develop that law whenever they
are called upon to do so." (citation omitted)); 193 F. Supp. at 381-82 ("Courts of this
country have the obligation to respect and enforce international law not only by vir-
tue of this country's status and membership in the community of nations but also
because international law is a part of the law of the United States." (citation omit-
ted)); cf. First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 775
(1972) (Powell, J., concurring):
Until international tribunals command a wider constituency, the courts of
various countries afford the best means for the development of a respected
body of international law. There is less hope for progress in this long-ne-
glected area if the resolution of all disputes involving an 'act of state' is rele-
gated to political rather than judicial processes.
102. See Koh, supra note 10, at 2363.
103. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 430. The Court of Appeals may have anticipated this
mistake. 307 F.2d at 861 ("One pitfall into which we could stumble would be the
identification as a fundamental principle of international law of some principle which
in truth is only an aspect of the public policy of our own nation and not a principle so
cherished by other civilized peoples.").
104. See infra note 243 and accompanying text.
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and capitalist ideologies, and the particular facts of the case grew di-
rectly out of a protracted trade dispute between Cuba and the United
States.10 5 We contend that had the case turned on a violation of jus
cogens, the results would have been entirely different. Consider how
the Court's reasoning would have changed had the alleged CIL viola-
tion been genocide or official torture, a universally condemned prac-
tice. According to Sabbatino's reasoning' 0 6 -reaffirmed in the
Restatement (Third) 7-judicial incorporation of CIL for such claims
would survive the act of state doctrine.
In this way, the Sabbatino Court established a "sliding scale."10 8
That is, the greater degree of codification and consensus supporting a
CIL norm, the more allowance courts have in finding attendant claims
actionable:
It should be apparent that the greater degree of codification or con-
sensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more
appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it,
since the courts can then focus on the application of an agreed prin-
ciple to circumstances of fact rather than on the sensitive task of
establishing a principle consistent with the national interest or with
international justice.' 09
This framework thus distinguishes between two types of interna-
tional law: (1) areas of international law in which the requisite con-
sensus is missing-such as expropriations-because countries are
politically divided on the issue; and (2) "areas of international law in
which consensus as to standards is greater and which do not represent
a battleground for conflicting ideologies. 0110
The latter area of international law, the Sabbatino Court explained,
is properly justicable, since it allows courts to comport with the "'con-
stitutional' underpinnings" of the act of state doctrine."' The revi-
sionist position, however, contends that the Court's federal common
law rule stands for a doctrine of judicial deference, if not absten-
105. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 401-05. The expropriation of respondent's property was
justified by the Cuban government as part of its direct response to the U.S. Sugar Act.
Id. at 402-03.
106. Id. at 430 n.34 ("There are, of course, areas of international law in which con-
sensus as to standards is greater and which do not represent a battleground for con-
flicting ideologies. This decision in no way intimates that the courts of this country
are broadly foreclosed from considering questions of international law.").
107. See Restatement (Third), supra note 14, at § 469 cmt. c.
108. Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp 246, 258
(D.D.C. 1985) (explaining that in Sabbatino "the Court established a sort of sliding
scale with respect to judicial application of international law").
109. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
110. Id. at 430 n.34; see also id. at 467 n.26 (White, J., dissenting) ("[S]ubsequent
cases not involving expropriations will require us to determine if the act of state doc-
trine applies and the Court's standard is the strength and clarity of the principles of
international law thought to govern the issue.").
111. Id. at 423.
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tion.11a A unanimous Supreme Court, on the contrary, recently ex-
plained, "[t]he act of state doctrine is not some vague doctrine of
abstention but a 'principle of decision. ... """ In W.S. Kirkpatrick &
Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp.,14 the Court rejected an act of
state defense, reiterating that "in Sabbatino . . .we observed that
sometimes, even though the validity of the act of a foreign sovereign
within its own territory is called into question, the policies underlying
the act of state doctrine may not justify its application. We suggested
that a sort of balancing approach could be applied . . . ."I" In this
way, the Court itself has broadly described Sabbatino as establishing
the enclave of federal common law of foreign relations," 6 a designa-
tion that Bradley and Goldsmith seem to resist.' 7 In sum, the proper
interpretation of Sabbatino is not that the act of state doctrine pre-
112. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24, at 861
("Sabbatino's federal common law analysis was designed to shield courts from in-
volvement in foreign affairs."); id. at 868 ("The Supreme Court's modern federalism
jurisprudence suggests the broader conclusion that CIL is never supreme federal law
in the absence of some authorization from the federal political branches."); Weisburd,
State Courts, supra note 24, at 46 ("[E]ven Sabbatino supported this limited view of
judicial authority; it refused to apply customary international law because doing so
might have interfered with the workings of the Executive.").
113. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 406
(1990) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
114. Id
115. Id at 409.
116. Atherton v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 117 S.Ct. 666, 673-74 (1997)
(cataloging areas of federal common law and describing Sabbatino in terms of -rela-
tionships with other countries"); Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451
U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (citing Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)):
[A]bsent some congressional authorization to formulate substantive rules of
decision, federal common law exists only in such narrow areas as those con-
cerned with ... international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of
States or our relations with foreign nations .... In these instances, our
federal system does not permit the controversy to be resolved under state
law ... because the . . . international nature of the controversy makes it
inappropriate for state law to control.
117. Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24, at 831
(quoting Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 219,273 (1972) and John
Norton Moore, Federalism and Foreign Relations, 1965 Duke L.J. 248,273); id. at 864
("[Scholars] interpreted Sabbatino broadly to 'establish[ ] foreign affairs as a domain
in which federal courts can make law with supremacy'-the so-called 'federal com-
mon law of foreign relations."' (quoting Stephen B. Burbank, Federal Judgments Law:
Sources of Authority and Sources of Rules, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 1551, 1577 (1992)); id. at
864:
Sabbatino is best regarded not as authority for an expansive federal common
law of foreign affairs but rather for the power of the federal judiciary to
make uniformly applicable rules (the act of state doctrine) designed to pro-
tect courts from entanglements in, and interbranch conflicts about, matters
for which they are not institutionally suited.
Id. (quoting Burbank, supra, at 1577); id. at 864 n.309 (explaining that Teras Indus-




cludes all CIL-as Bradley and Goldsmith suggest.' 18 Rather, the
doctrine precludes only those domains of public international law that
hold either a disputed, inchoate, or undefined status.119 Yet, if all de-
ficiencies are resolved-that is, if a claim is based on obligatory, uni-
versal, and well-defined CIL-Sabbatino does not foreclose the law's
application.
2. Sabbatino's Embrace of the Modern Position
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Sabbatino also provides strong
support for the proposition that CIL is federal common law. In this
section, we highlight three important ways in which the Sabbatino rea-
soning reflects the Supreme Court's endorsement of the modern posi-
tion. First, the Court's logic applies to CIL as well as the act of state
doctrine. Second, the structure of the Court's reasoning including the
evidence marshalled to support its conclusions supports the modern
position. Third, the Court authorizes federal courts to fashion com-
mon law rules in the area of foreign relations.
a. Sabbatino's Logic Supports the Modern Position
Applying the Sabbatino Court's federal common law analysis to
CIL provides a sound conceptual basis for the modern position. In
Sabbatino, the Court's description of federal common law fortified
support for the modern position that CIL is part of federal common
law.
In particular, the Sabbatino Court announced two fundamental fea-
tures of federal common law-unique federal interests and the need
118. Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24, at 828-29
("In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court held that there was no exception to the act of state
doctrine for acts of state that violated CIL."); see also id. at 860.
119. In contrast to Bradley and Goldsmith's interpretation, our understanding of
Sabbatino more adequately explains Justice White's dissenting statement that the
Court had "declared the ascertainment and application of international law beyond
the competence of the courts of the United States in a large and important category of
cases." 376 U.S. at 439 (White, J., dissenting). Indeed, the Court had eliminated from
consideration a "category of [international law] cases," though not all international
law (and not unambiguous and universal CIL). Id. Bradley and Goldsmith's use of
Justice White's statement to support their expansive claims thus misses the mark.
Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24, at 860
(using Justice White's statement to demonstrate that Sabbatino implies CIL is beyond
court jurisdiction without political branch authorization), with Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at
467 n.26 (White, J., dissenting) ("[S]ubsequent cases not involving expropriations will
require us to determine if the act of state doctrine applies and the Court's standard is
the strength and clarity of the principles of international law thought to govern the
issue."). Finally, in a subsequent decision which rejected an act of state defense, Jus-
tice White, who delivered the plurality opinion, quoted Sabbatino's sliding-scale para-
graph in full. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 704
(1976). He explained that in the matter at hand-principles of restrictive immunity
for commercial activities of states-"discernible rules of international law" governed
in contrast to the rules of law concerning expropriations in which "[t]here may be
little codification or consensus." Id. at 704.
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for national uniformity. CIL determinations exhibit both features.
The first facet of federal common law analyzed in Sabbatino-unique
federal interests-are premised upon the delicacy of adjudicating the
acts of foreign governments.12 0 Here, the Court recognized that de-
ciding to evaluate whether a foreign government's action violates in-
ternational law raises two uniquely federal concerns: the federal
separation of powers and the country's "pursuit of goals ... for the
community of nations as a whole in the international sphere."'121
The second facet of federal common law-national uniformity-
concerns the country's need to respond with unity to the global com-
munity on matters of international law. Or as Judge Jessup put it:
"The duty to apply [international law] is one imposed upon the
United States as an international person."'" On this point, the Sab-
batino Court recognized-since the act of state doctrine does not rest
on a statute-they had to find other parallels."2 Toward this end, the
Court cited the example of managing equitable apportionment of in-
terstate waters' 24 -a legal issue that requires a unified national re-
sponse and that has been an enclave of federal common law since the
day Erie was decided.' 5
The Court also found support for this framework in various consti-
tutional and statutory provisions "reflecting a concern for uniformity
in this country's dealings with foreign nations and indicating a desire
to give matters of international significance to the jurisdiction of fed-
eral institutions."' 26 What constitutional and statutory provisions
could the Court rely on to establish this understanding of federal com-
mon law? Among other provisions, the Court relied on Article I,
which grants Congress the power to define and punish offenses against
120. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 424.
121. Id. at 423. Accordingly, as Justice Harlan explained, allowing each of the fifty
states to develop their own body of law would collapse the possibility of balancing
these federal concerns:
[I]t is plain that the problems involved are uniquely federal in nature. If
federal authority, in this instance this Court, orders the field of judicial com-
petence in this area for the federal courts, and the state courts are left free to
formulate their own rules, the purposes behind the doctrine could be as ef-
fectively undermined as if there had been no federal pronouncement on the
subject.
Id. at 424.
122. Jessup, supra note 48, at 743.
123. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 426.
124. Id at 426-27.
125. The Court discussed Hinderlider v. La Plata River Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938), a
decision rendered the same day as Erie which announced the federal common law
enclave for interstate water disputes. Erie, 376 U.S. at 426-27. Notably, this area of
the law has a well-accepted tradition of incorporating international law as federal
common law to resolve interstate disputes. See Field, Sources of Law, supra note 38,
at 916 ("In exercising its power [in interstate controversies], the Court has been
guided largely by principles of international law ... .
126. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427 n.25.
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the law of nations and § 1350's Alien Torts Claims Act.'27 This under-
standing of the federal common law pronouncement in Sabbatino has
not been lost on federal courts in ATCA cases; several opinions have
found guidance in the Court's use of the ATCA to support Sabba-
tino's federal common law holding.'28
127. Id. Indeed, scholarship on the ATCA's history supports this understanding;
the ATCA grew out of a need to have the federal government respond uniformly in
its dealings with foreign nations. In 1781, the Continental Congress passed a resolu-
tion, which is regarded as an early model of the ATCA. See Burley, supra note 8, at
476 (discussing 21 J. of the Continental Cong. 1136-37 (1781)); William R. Casto, The
Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of
Nations, 18 Conn. L. Rev. 467, 490-91, 495 (1986) (same). The resolution, however,
was merely suggestive; it lacked meaningful authority over the states due to the mini-
mal power the Congress held under the Articles of Confederation. In the years inter-
ceding the 1781 Resolution and the passage of the ATCA, two relevant foreign affairs
debacles occurred. The majority view is that these two events probably motivated the
First Congress's adoption of the ATCA. See Cicero, supra note 55, at 334-36; Randall,
supra note 8, at 24-28; cf. D'Amato, supra note 5, at 63 (acknowledging particular
incidents but calling attention to national security interests as a broader, "overriding
purpose" of ATCA). But see Burley, supra note 8, at 475-92 (arguing that overriding
purpose was sense of national duty to honor international law). Both events con-
cerned an offense committed against a foreign ambassador in violation of the law of
nations, one committed by another foreign national-"the Marbois Affair"-and the
other by a U.S. official-"the Van Berkel Incident." In both instances, the states
initially failed to address the issue adequately. See Casto, supra, at 491, 494. In the
wake of the Marbois Affair, foreign ministers "demanded that Congress declare the
law of nations to be part of the common law of each of the states." Randall, supra
note 55, at 24 (quoting Rosenthal, The Marbois-Longchamps Affair, 63 Pa. Mag. His.
294, 294 (1939)). Disabled by the Articles of Confederation, the Continental Con-
gress commissioned John Jay, as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to inform foreign dele-
gates of its legislative incapacities. 28 J. of the Continental Cong. 374 (resolution of
Apr. 27, 1785) (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1933). The Congress had to content itself with rec-
ommending to the states that they pass legislation to punish future threats to the
"dignity of sovereign powers in the person of their ministers or servants." Id. When
the Van Berkel incident later arose, Jay reported back to the Continental Congress
that lack of federal power remained and the Congress could merely urge New York to
institute judicial proceedings. See Casto, supra, at 494 n.152. The ATCA repaired
these federal infirmities.
128. In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 503
(9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that district court used Sabbatino footnote 25 to support an
approach which "comports with the view that the First Congress enacted the prede-
cessor to § 1350 to provide a federal forum for transitory torts (a tort action which
follows the tortfeasor wherever he goes), whenever such actions implicate the foreign
relations of the United States" (citation omitted)); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,
726 F.2d 774, 790-791 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) ("the Supreme Court
has at least twice cited section 1350 as a statutory example of congressional intent to
make questions likely to affect foreign relations originally cognizable in federal
courts." (citing Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427 & n.25; Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-30 &
n.6 (1942)); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 182 (D. Mass. 1995) (citing Sabba-
tino's footnote 25 to support the proposition that "by not tethering § 1350 to causes of
action and remedies previously developed under roughly analogous municipal law,
the federal courts will be better able to develop a uniform federal common law re-
sponse to international law violations, a result consistent with the statute's intent in
conferring federal court jurisdiction over such actions in the first place"); Forti v.
Suarez-Mason I, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1540 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (citing footnote 25 as
further support that "Congress intended § 1350 to provide concurrent federal jurisdic-
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Bradley and Goldsmith deny that the "logic of [Sabbatino's] feder-
alization of the act of state doctrine applies equally to the status of
CIL."'12 9 Specifically, Bradley and Goldsmith assert that this analogy
should not extend to the "new CIL of human rights" given the polit-
ical branches' conditional assent to human rights treaties.13 0 This
claim is not responsive, however. Our position is not that Sabbatino
endorses the wholesale incorporation of the "new CIL of human
rights." Rather, we maintain that universally recognized human rights
norms are incorporated as federal common law. As our discussion of
the Sabbatino Court's "sliding scale" demonstrates, the Court found
no separation of powers difficulties in applying such norms. In addi-
tion, as we discuss in some detail in part III, the political branches also
endorse the federal common law of universal human rights. Finally,
the broadening scope of "new CIL" cautions against relaxing federal
control over CIL. That is, U.S. relations with other nations, the citi-
zens of other nations, and its own citizenry is increasingly governed by
international legal principles. The content of international legal
norms will therefore increasingly structure foreign relations. As such,
the need for the United States "to speak with one voice" on interna-
tional law is correspondingly increased.
b. Sabbatino's Reliance on Judge Jessup's Defense of the Modern
Position
In pronouncing foreign relations a post-Erie enclave of federal com-
mon law, the Sabbatino Court turned to Philip Jessup's leading
article:13
1
It seems fair to assume that the Court did not have rules like the act
of state doctrine in mind when it decided Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.
Soon thereafter, Professor Philip C. Jessup, now a judge of the In-
ternational Court of Justice, recognized the potential dangers were
Erie extended to legal problems affecting international relations.
He cautioned that rules of international law should not be left to
divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations. His basic ra-
tionale is equally applicable to the act of state doctrine. 32
tion over alien tort claims alleging treaty or customary international law violations in
order to facilitate federal oversight of matters involving foreign relations and interna-
tional law.").
129. Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights Litigation, supra note 24, at 338.
130. I& at 339-40; see also id. at 340 ("The logic of post-Erie federal common law,
even under a broad reading of Sabbatino, does not permit federal courts to do via
federal common law what the political branches have clearly prohibited in their con-
ditional assent to [human rights] treaties.").
131. See Jessup, supra note 48.
132. 376 U.S. at 425 (footnote omitted). The Court's use of the Jessup article in
such a manner is significant. Jessup's article is a short two-and three-quarter pages
and his argument is one precise point: "[NV]hatever the specific grounds for disposing
of an individual case, any attempt to extend the doctrine of the Tompkins case to
international law should be repudiated by the Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Brandeis
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The Court's use of Jessup provides strong evidence for the modern
position.
Professors Bradley and Goldsmith acknowledge that the Supreme
Court's direct endorsement of Jessup's article gave rise to the modern
position. 33 However, they assert that this endorsement proves little:
"[O]ne can view [the Court's endorsement of Jessup] as evidence that
Sabbatino embraced the modern position only if one ignores what the
Court in Sabbatino actually held and did. The Court held only that
the act of state doctrine has the status of federal common law.' 3  This
claim is crucial for Bradley and Goldsmith since, on their reading, the
Court described the act of state doctrine as a separation-of-powers
issue (as opposed to an issue of international law). 35 Reconciling the
Court's use of Jessup with the revisionist interpretation of the case,
however, proves terribly difficult. This exceedingly narrow under-
standing of the Court's holding is flawed.
First, whatever its source, the Court's reasoning is that the act of
state doctrine is federal common law because this rule is analogous to
(the inarguably federal) international law. At a minimum, this is
clearly the import of the Jessup quotation. The Court is aware of this
claim. After discussing the potential sources of the act of state doc-
trine, the Court maintained that "[w]hatever considerations are
thought to predominate, it is plain that the problems involved are
uniquely federal in nature."' 36 The Court considered the source of the
rule analytically irrelevant to the federal common law determination.
Second, the Court also held that the scope of the act of state doc-
trine is governed by federal common law.137 As we describe in some
detail below, the applicability of the act of state doctrine turns in part
on the relevant international norm's degree of codification. That is,
settled principles of international law would presumptively not trigger
the act of state doctrine. Therefore, CIL is federal law because CIL
conditions the application of the doctrine.
Third, Bradley and Goldsmith oversimplify the Sabbatino Court's
analysis of the act of state doctrine's source. As Bradley and Gold-
smith correctly note, the act of state doctrine is considered "a conse-
was surely not thinking of international law when he wrote his dictum." Jessup, supra
note 48 at 743. Hence, given that the Court signed onto the article's conclusions, it is
difficult to argue that only one aspect of Jessup's point is being supported. Jessup had
only one basic point.
133. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24, at 827.
134. Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights Litigation, supra note 24, at 336.
135. Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24, at 859-60;
see also Weisburd, State Courts, supra note 24, at 43-44 ("The holding in Sabbatino,
however, was that the act of state doctrine-a rule of domestic law-was a matter of
federal law, not that customary international law was federal law.").
136. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 424 (emphasis added).
137. See id. at 427 ("We conclude that the scope of the act of state doctrine must be
determined according to federal law.").
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quence of domestic separation of powers.""3 The revisionist
interpretation of Sabbatino, however, obscures the importance of this
point. Most significantly, the Court considered international law the
exclusive province of the federal government. Of course, the act of
state doctrine delimits the scope of CIL actionable in federal courts,
but the contours of the domain of actionable international law is the
responsibility of the federal courts.
In short, Bradley and Goldsmith tacitly reject what we consider a
relatively straightforward interpretation of Sabbatino-the act of state
doctrine is justified in terms of both separation-of-powers concerns
international law: The Sabbatino Court "conclude[d] that both the na-
tional interest and progress toward the goal of establishing the rule of
law among nations are best served by maintaining intact the act of
state doctrine in this realm of its application." 39 Not surprisingly, the
American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States, which followed soon after the decision,
noted that "the holding of the Sabbatino case that Erie v. Tompkins
does not apply to the act of state doctrine would appear to apply a
fortiori to questions of international law."' 40
138. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 404
(1990).
139. 376 U.S. at 437 (emphasis added). Sabbatino did not repudiate the classic un-
derstanding-from Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)-that the act of
state doctrine rests substantially on principles of international comity. See Sabbatino,
376 U.S. at 416 (discussing "classic American statement of the act of state doctrine"
found in Underhill; and stating that "[n]one of this Court's subsequent cases... mani-
fest any retreat from Underhill"). Rather, Sabbatino confirmed the expansion of the
doctrine's focus to separation-of-powers interests, as well. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal,
963 F. Supp. 880, 892-95 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (discussing classic and more robust contem-
porary formulations of act of state doctrine). Compare Bradford Clark's discussion of
the element of international law in the Court's application of the act of state doctrine:
Although the Sabbatino Court asserted that "international law does not
require application of the [act of state] doctrine," in the sense that most
countries "fail to follow the rule rigidly," the Court acknowledged that the
doctrine reflects "deep seated" "concepts of territorial sovereignty" shared
by many nations. In other words, the act of state doctrine derives from well-
established principles of the law of nations, particularly the principle that
"the jurisdiction of [every] nation, within its own territory, is necessarily ex-
clusive and absolute."
Application of these principles does not require the courts to engage in
constitutionally questionable lawmaking activities, but merely to ascertain
and apply a preexisting practice suggested by traditional and verifiable prin-
ciples of the law of nations. In this sense, judicial application of the act of
state doctrine is much like application of the rule derived from the law
merchant in Swift.
Clark, supra note 38, at 1300-01(citations omitted).
140. American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States § 3, reporters' note 2 (1965).
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c. Sabbatino and the Federal Common Law of Foreign Relations
Furthermore, the Sabbatino Court established a distinct post-Erie
enclave of federal common law: "[T]he federal common law of for-
eign relations.' 141  Bradley and Goldsmith acknowledge the
"plausib[ility]" of this view.142 Rather than deny that Sabbatino rec-
ognizes foreign relations issues as uniquely federal, Bradley and Gold-
smith only question the expansiveness of this view. They do not
refute the claim that the federal common law of foreign relations nec-
essarily extends to customary international human rights law.
The revisionist interpretation of Sabbatino offers few effective ave-
nues of criticism on this point. Bradley and Goldsmith maintain that
the act of state doctrine is merely an abstention rule.143 On this read-
ing, the Sabbatino Court vests all foreign affairs power in the political
branches of the federal government. Of course, as we noted earlier,
the Supreme Court's holding in Kirkpatrick discredits this claim.' 44 In
addition, the "sliding scale" analysis in Sabbatino itself demonstrates
the implausibility of the revisionist interpretation. Finally, what may
be called the "deference component" in the act of state doctrine
should not be read too broadly: "The act of state doctrine represents
an exception to the general rule that a court of the United States,
where appropriate jurisdictional standards are met, will decide cases
before it by choosing the rules appropriate for decision from among
various sources of law including international law.' 45 Indeed, em-
phasizing the deference component is in tension with the political
branches' own response to Sabbatino. Congress soon passed the
Hickenlooper Amendment which effectively overturned the court's
decision regarding expropriations. 46 The Executive Branch has also
141. This view enjoys widespread support. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 37, at
350 ("Sabbatino still stands for the important proposition that in cases related to for-
eign affairs, federal courts may fashion federal common law."); Redish, Tensions,
supra note 38, at 125 (arguing that Sabbatino recognized the power of the federaljudiciary to create federal common law in the field of international relations).
142. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights Litigation, supra note 24, at 341.
143. See id. at 338 ("Sabbatino crafted the act of state doctrine to prohibit domestic
application of CIL.").
144. See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
145. First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 763 (1972)
(plurality opinion) (citation omitted).
146. Section 301(d)(4) of the Public Law 88-633, 78 Stat. 1009, 1013, 22 U.S.C.
§ 2370(e)(2). The amendment removes the act of state doctrine-as enunciated by
Sabbatino-as a bar on court determinations of whether a foreign government's ex-
propriation violates international law. The President does, however, retain the power
under the amendment to compel judicial abstention in expropriation cases.
Interestingly, the Hickenlooper Amendment was applied in the Sabbatino case on
remand. In the district court opinion, the executive branch declined to exercise its
prerogative under the amendment. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 272 F. Supp. 836,
837 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The court, applying the Amendment, held that the Cuban gov-
ernment's expropriation violated international law, thus reinstating the Court of Ap-
peals previous holding. Id. at 838.
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since supported a Court overrule of Sabbatino's deference compo-
nent, 47 and federal courts have subsequently decided to read the def-
erence component of the doctrine narrowly.1 48
Clearly, Sabbatino's articulation of the federal common law of for-
eign relations should extend to CIL human rights cases. Court pro-
nouncements on the U.S. understanding of CIL necessarily affect our
foreign relations, especially in cases that involve foreign nationals or
foreign governments. In these matters, the constitutional underpin-
nings assigning appropriate spheres of competence to the different
branches of government are the same structural principles involved in
147. In Alfred Dunhill, the Court reprinted a letter from the Legal Advisor of the
State Department to the Solicitor General. Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 706-711 (1990). The final paragraph of the document concludes:
In general this Department's experience provides little support for a pre-
sumption that adjudication of acts of foreign states in accordance with rele-
vant principles of international law would embarrass the conduct of foreign
policy. Thus, it is our view that if the Court should decide to overrule the
holding in Sabbatino so that acts of state would thereafter be subject to adju-
dication in American courts under international law, we would not antici-
pate embarrassment to the conduct of the foreign policy of the United
States.
Id. at 710-11.
Over time, the Executive Branch, as different Administrations are wont to do, has
fluctuated in its position on such matters. Cf. Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary Inter-
national Law, supra note 24, at 867 n.330 (discussing various positions taken by differ-
ent Administrations in Filartiga cases). In one recent case, the Administration
advocated case-by-case review of act of state claims for all controversies that touch
the nation's nerves. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Re-
spondent, W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400
(1989) (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428). The Supreme Court, however, adopted a
more narrow ruling: In cases which do not reach the validity of acts of foreign gov-
ernments, the doctrine does not apply. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 493 U.S. at 406. As
such, the Court foreclosed the Executive's attempt to adopt different positions in dif-
ferent circumstances, and instead adopted a broad invalidation of an aspect of Sabba-
tino's deference principle.
148. See, e.g., Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The
statement by the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York is quite
forceful in this regard:
Nor has the act of state doctrine received an enthusiastic response from the
political branches, which are charged with regulating the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. After Sabbatino, Congress limited the doctrine to prevent its
application to claims for specific property located in the United States. For-
eign Assistance Act of 1961, § 620(e)(2), 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982). Sim-
ilarly, in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, § 4(a)(3), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(3) (1982), Congress deprived foreign states of immunity from ju-
risdiction in the federal courts in regard to claims based on their alleged
taking of property located in the United States in violation of international
law. Our national policy reflects, if anything, a reexamination of Sabbatino,
rather than a political consensus for its transformation into a jurisdictional
bar through its indiscriminate amalgamation with the analogous but similarly
questionable device of judicial abstention. Absent some guidance to the
contrary from the political branches, the present circumstances do not justify
a refusal to perform the duty to adjudicate.
Id. (citation omitted).
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cases adjudicating actions of foreign states. Judicial interpretations of
the law of nations are just that-evaluations of the validity and appli-
cability of the collective legal practices and obligations of the commu-
nity of nations. Passing on such questions triggers many of the same
concerns for "national uniformity" and "uniquely federal interests"
that sustained Judge Jessup and the Sabbatino Court's reasoning.
Finally, we argue that our interpretation of Sabbatino and its prog-
eny offers strong evidence that CIL should be federal common law in
many, if not all, cases involving acts of foreign governments (or ac-
tions taken under color of foreign law). At the very least, in cases that
involve CIL and the acts of a foreign state, federal common law
should govern. Inquiry into the status of the alleged CIL is, in fact, an
elemental part of the federal "principle of decision;"' 149 the assessment
of the particular CIL is counterpoised against the court's decision
whether to abstain under Sabbatino's balancing approach. That is, the
inquiry into the status and applicability of the CIL is itself a compo-
nent of the federal common law of the act of state doctrine.
In cases that do not specifically raise an act of state inquiry, the
same principles are at work. Analogous to the fact pattern in Sabba-
tino, international human rights cases generally evaluate the acts of
foreign states and their instrumentalities. 5 ° The same questions and
concerns are raised in these cases as in the Sabbatino context.151 In-
deed, the command that municipal courts "must expound, apply and
develop ... [international] law whenever they are called upon to do
so, ' 152 is a pronouncement about common law. The post-Erie ques-
tion is: Which common law? Judge Jessup's reasoning applies here:
Any question of applying international law in our courts involves
the foreign relations of the United States and thus can be brought
within a federal power. The application of international law by the
federal courts does not need to be justified by the theory that we
took over international law as part of the common law. Interna-
tional law is applied by the courts of many countries who look back
149. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427-28; see also W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 493 U.S. at 404-
05 (discussing the changes that the act of state doctrine has undergone).
150. Our discussion of the structure of the modem litigation in Part II demon-
strates the close connection between Sabbatino and these cases. The case law's reli-
ance on Sabbatino for the decision's pronouncement of federal common law of
foreign relations and for its specific limiting principle is strong evidence of the directly
analogous, if not common, concerns.
151. Cf Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, W.S.
Kirkpatrick & Co., 493 U.S. at 400 ("Even private litigation challenging the sovereign
act of a foreign state affects the foreign relations interests of the United States, the
other country involved, and the community of nations - matters for which the Presi-
dent and Congress are responsible under the Constitution.").
152. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 861 (2d Cir. 1962) (cita-
tion omitted); see also id. at 860 ("In the absence of any relevant treaty, enactment of
the legislature, act of the executive, or controlling judicial decision, we have been told
to draw the guiding concepts of international law from the customs and usages of
civilized nations.").
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upon no inheritance from England.... The duty to apply [interna-
tional law] is one imposed upon the United States as an interna-
tional person. The several states of the Union are entities unknown
to international law. It would be unsound as it would be unwise to
make our state courts our ultimate authority for pronouncing the
rules of international law.153
The clear implication of Judge Jessup's reasoning is that CIL is federal
common law.
All cases that determine whether a foreign state or its instrumental-
ity has violated CIL fit this category; there are, after all, only a "hand-
ful of crimes to which the law of nations attributes individual
responsibility."'" Furthermore, such cases necessarily involve courts
passing on the validity of the foreign government's act. Accordingly,
these judicial inquiries satisfy the Court's Kirkpatrick test."' The doc-
trine may also reach cases in which nominally private entities are
deemed state actors either under a conventional state action test'5' or
according to definitions of a state under international law. 5
In practice, the federal common law of CIL has been limited to a
small set of universally recognized human rights norms. In the ongo-
ing ATCA litigation, federal courts have defined, meticulously ob-
served, and rigorously applied this "federal common law of universal
human rights." The Sabbatino framework has figured directly in a
number of ATCA decisions.158 As we detail below, the current litiga-
tion is structured against the backdrop of Sabbatino's sliding-scale. In
the following section, we document the federal courts' rigorous appli-
cation of Sabbatino's dynamic framework to ATCA claims. These
cases demonstrate the built-in restraints of the federal common law of
CIL; they also disprove the revisionist interpretation of the Sabbatino
decision.159
153. Jessup, supra note 48, at 743.
154. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Ed-
wards, J., concurring); see infra discussion at Part II.C.l.
155. See infra discussion at Part II.C.1.
156. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 891-92 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
157. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 244-45 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing and applying
functional definition of state under international law); id. at 245 (applying standards
for action taken under color of law).
158. See, e.g., Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 790 (Edwards, J., concurring); id. at 802 (Bork.
J., concurring); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881; Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, 623 F. Supp 246, 258 (D.D.C. 1985); Jafari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539
F. Supp. 209, 215 (N.D. Ill. 1982); see also text accompanying notes 176-224 (cases
using the Sabbatino framework).
159. Notably, Sabbatino's dynamic framework has found similar expression in act
of state cases. In several decisions, courts have found that universal and well-defined
CIL satisfies the sliding-scale. As such, these cases demonstrate that Sabbatino does
not stand for an inflexible federal common law of judicial restraint, but has often been
invoked to support judicial determination of CIL claims. See, e.g., Liu v. The Repub-
lic of China, 892 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the acts of state doctrine did
not bar wrongful death action against the Republic of China for the government-
sponsored murder of a man in California); id. at 1433 (noting that a -factor to be
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B. Standards for Actionable CIL
The ATCA case law has been shaped by Sabbatino's pronounce-
ments on the federal common law of foreign relations. Applying the
sliding-scale, the Sabbatino Court explained that in evaluating expro-
priation claims: "It is difficult to imagine the courts of this country
embarking on adjudication in an area which touches more sensitively
the practical and ideological goals of the various members of the com-
munity of nations."'160 In accordance with the sliding-scale frame-
work, however, the Court explained that courts should not retreat
from adjudicating claims grounded in universal international law,
stating
"[tlhere are, of course, areas of international law in which consensus
as to standards is greater and which do not represent a battleground
for conflicting ideologies. This decision in no way intimates that the
courts of this country are broadly foreclosed from considering ques-
tions of international law."'' The Second Circuit expressed this in
Filartiga:
The case at bar presents us with a situation diametrically opposed to
the conflicted state of law that confronted the Sabbatino Court. In-
deed, to paraphrase that Court's statement, there are few, if any,
considered is the degree of international consensus regarding an activity" and quoting
Sabbatino sliding-scale); De Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1540 (D.C. Cir.
1984) ("In Sabbatino the Court was careful to distinguish between judicial adjudica-
tion of the validity of a foreign act when there are no standards for adjudication from
those cases in which United States treaties or international law provide specific gui-
dance to the Judiciary in a particular area of foreign relations."); id. (explaining Sab-
batino restraint component is not advisable "when there are generally accepted tenets
of international law concerning the foreign act"); see also Alfred Dunhill of London v.
Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 704 (1976) (applying rules of international law when
they are clearly discernible). In the Filartiga litigation, the district court, on remand
of the case, addressed the act of state doctrine's application to the case. Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 862 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). The court applied Sabbatino's
sliding scale, holding that jurisdiction was appropriate:
[T]he Court of Appeals held that the alleged acts constitute, by the 'general
assent of civilized nations,' a 'clear and unambiguous' violation of the law of
nations. As the Supreme Court noted in discussing the act of state doctrine
in the Sabbatino decision, 'the greater the degree of codification or consen-
sus concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it
is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it.
Id. at 862 (citation omitted); see also Kadic, 70 F.3d at 250-51 (applying Sabbatino
sliding scale to grant jurisdiction over CIL claims of genocide and war crimes). "[Sab-
batino] was careful to recognize the doctrine 'in the absence of ... unambiguous
agreement regarding controlling legal principles,' such as exist in the pending litiga-
tion, and applied the doctrine only in a context-expropriation of an alien's prop-
erty-in which world opinion was sharply divided." Id. (omission in original)
(citations omitted).
160. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 430 (1964).
161. Id. at 430 n.34; see also id. at 467 n.26 (White, J., dissenting) ("[S]ubsequent
cases not involving expropriations will require us to determine if the act of state doc-
trine applies and the Court's standard is the strength and clarity of the principles of
international law thought to govern the issue.").
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issues in international law today on which opinion seems to be so
united as the limitations on a state's power to torture persons held
in its custody. 162
Accordingly, the Filartiga court's holding that official torture is justici-
able followed Sabbatino's controlling mandate for federal common
law.
The Sabbatino Court's sliding-scale has received expression through
a three-part limiting principle: Federal courts have adopted a rela-
tively stringent tripartite test for assessing whether an alleged act con-
stitutes an actionable CIL claim. As the doctrine's progenitor,
Filartiga is often cited for the proposition that, under § 1350, judicially
cognizable CIL must be (1) universal; (2) definable; and (3) obliga-
tory.163 This tripartite test effectively limits the range of actionable
claims to a privileged subset of CIL-jus cogens (or "compelling law")
violations. That is, successful ATCA plaintiffs, as a practical matter,
must raise claims based on jus cogens norms'64-a short list of settled,
peremptory norms which sit at the highest echelon of international
law.165
162. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881 (citing Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428). But cf. Bradley &
Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24, at 834 (stating that the Flar-
tiga court "made no attempt to fit CIL within the rationale of Sabbatino").
163. See, eg., In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467,
1475-76 (9th Cir. 1994) ("We thus join the Second Circuit in concluding that the Alien
Tort Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, creates a cause of action for violations of specific, univer-
sal and obligatory international human rights standards. .. ." (citing Filartiga, 630
F.2d at 885-87)); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184 (D. Mass. 1995); Forti v.
Suarez-Mason I, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1539-40 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ("The contours of this
requirement have been delineated by the Filartiga court and by Judge Edwards in Tel-
Oren .... This 'international tort' must be one which is definable, obligatory (rather
then hortatory), and universally condemned." (citing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881) (other
citations omitted)).
164. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (came into force Jan. 27, 1980); Siderman de Blake v.
Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[J]ts cogens 'embraces
customary laws considered binding on all nations,' and 'is derived from values taken
to be fundamental by the international community, rather than from the fortuitous or
self-interested choices of nations."' (quoting David F. Klein, A Theory for the Appli-
cation of the Customary International Law of Human Rights by Domestic Courts, 13
Yale J. Int'l L. 332, 350-51 (1988))); Restatement (Third), supra note 14, at § 102 cmt.
k.; Craig Scott, et al., A Memorial for Bosnia: Framework of Legal Arguments Con-
cerning the Lawfulness of the Maintenance of the United Nations Security Council's
Arms Embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina, 16 Mich. J. Int'l L 1, 28 (1994) (Jus
cogens norms "derive from principles that the legal conscience of humankind deems
essential to coexistence in the international community.")
165. Indeed, courts' explanation of the controlling test for actionable CIL fre-
quently approximates the language used to describe a jus cogens violation. For in-
stance, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, relying on both
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884, and Forti I, 672 F. Supp at 1539-40, defined the third compo-
nent of the test in terminology which tracks jus cogens language: "[T~he prohibition
against [the action] is non-derogable and therefore binding at all times upon all ac-
tors." Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 184; see also In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos,
Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 503 (9th Cir. 1992) ( finding a suit of wrongful
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Accordingly, the three components of the ATCA's "jus cogens
test 166 are designed to ensure that a circumscribed but fundamentally
important set of legal claims succeeds. The First,167 Second,168 and
Ninth 169 Circuits have done most of the work in elaborating the mean-
ing and purposes of the three limiting standards. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit, for example, explained that the test's
standard of universality, in combination with the component of obli-
gation, purposefully establishes a relatively stringent criteria. 170 The
rationale undergirding such requirements is based primarily on the
principle of consent-namely, the courts of United States should not
sit in judgment of the valid acts of another state in the absence of
agreement on the controlling principles of law.' 71 As such, these stan-
dards coincide with the Sabbatino Court's concern for finding a con-
sensus in order for courts to "focus on the application of an agreed
principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the sensitive task of
establishing a principle not inconsistent with the national interest or
with international justice. 172
The third component-definability-narrows the potential claims
to those that are clearly appropriate for judicial determination. That
death "by official torture in violation of jus cogens norm of international law, properly
invokes the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts under § 1350"); Sidernian
de Blake, 965 F.2d at 717 ("In Filartiga, though the court was not explicitly consider-
ing jus cogens, Judge Kaufman's survey of the universal condemnation of torture pro-
vides much support for the view that torture violates jus cogens."); Doe v. Unocal
Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 890 (C.D. Cal. 1997) ("Under the ATCA, jurisdiction may be
based on a violation 'of a jus cogens [sic] norm which enjoys the highest status within
international law."' (citations omitted)). To be sure, certain advocates have suggested
possibilities of further expansion of § 1350 claims which would arguably dispense with
the jus cogens limitation. See Steinhardt, supra note 55, at 81 (suggesting prospective
ATCA suits from future solidification of norms against free speech restrictions and
race and gender discrimination). According to the settled case law, however, such
developments would ultimately still have to meet all of the tripartite burdens.
166. Throughout this Article, we refer to the tripartite test interchangeably as the
ATCA's "jus cogens test." Admittedly, courts do not explicitly recognize that they
seek to limit actionable CIL claims to jus cogens violations. However, such a limita-
tion is the practical effect of the tripartite test's decision-making criteria. Conse-
quently, the terminology we adopt has significant descriptive power in getting to the
heart of the ongoing litigation.
167. See, e.g., Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 178-80.
168. See, e.g., Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876.
169. See, e.g., In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d at 1475; Forti, 672 F. Supp.
at 1531.
170. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881 ("The requirement that a rule command the 'gen-
eral assent of civilized nations' to become binding upon them all is a stringent one.").
171. The Filartiga court followed its evaluation of the stringency of the standard
with a recognition of its normative logic: "Were this not so, the courts of one nation
might feel free to impose idiosyncratic legal rules upon others, in the name of apply-
ing international law." Id; see also Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1540 ("The requirement of
international consensus is of paramount importance, for it is that consensus which
evinces the willingness of nations to be bound by the particular legal principle, and so
can justify the court's exercise of jurisdiction over the international tort claim.").
172. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
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is, the test's requirement of definability, or specificity,173 demands
that clear parameters determine the norm's content. 74 In accordance
with the Sabbatino sliding-scale, a proposed norm must have sharply
specified, universally agreed-upon boundaries to be actionable in U.S.
courts.
In short, the status of jus cogens carries such significant legal weight
that courts have closely guarded against unwarranted expansion. The
range of potential jus cogens violations are, of course, not a closed set.
Other norms may yet ripen into the same state of universal accept-
ance, definability, and obligation. Nevertheless, federal courts have
been fairly strict in determining whether an alleged offense constitutes
such a violation. 75 The results of ATCA cases demonstrate the im-
portance of these restraining principles. In furtherance of this point,
the following section outlines the composition of the present case law
by identifying the types of claims that have satisfied-or failed to sat-
isfy-the courts' tripartite standard.
C. The Content of CIL under § 1350 Litigation
Federal courts require ATCA plaintiffs to allege, at minimum, viola-
tions of universally recognized human rights. The following discussion
presents a representative sample of the nature of these suits. In this
section, we detail the types of claims that succeed under § 1350. As
with legal standards in general, the ATCA "jus cogens test," contains
a set of claims which clearly meet its standards, a set that clearly fail,
and a set that falls in the gray area between the two.
Before analyzing the contemporary litigation, we should make one
point clear: Our catalogue of the ATCA case law can provide only a
snapshot of the present state of actionable CIL. While the tripartite
test remains static, certain CIL norms may still emerge into the posi-
tion of jus cogens. As such, ATCA jurisprudence includes a dynamic
element that the following discussion is not meant to obscure. Per-
haps this element partially explains the "gray area" between crystal-
lized and emergent universal CIL. Regardless, the structure of the
litigation still reveals that the federal judiciary's rigorous application
of the tripartite rule successfully polices the border such that only in-
controvertible jus cogens claims are found actionable under the
ATCA.
173. In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d at 1475.
174. Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1543.
175. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 189 (D. Mass. 1995) ([Claution is re-
quired in identifying new violations of jus cogens."): Forti, 672 F. Supp, at 154243
("Before this Court may adjudicate a court claim under § 1350, it must be satisfied
that the legal standard it is to apply is one with universal acceptance and definition;




1. Easy Cases Part I: Incontrovertible Jus Cogens Violations
While the full range of customary international human rights law
may be subject to considerable debate, a subcategory comprising jus
cogens prohibitions has been settled beyond question. The incontro-
vertible nature of these proscriptions have received uniform recogni-
tion by the federal courts in § 1350 litigation. Indeed, these cases
often introduce into federal courtrooms the most shockingly severe
human rights atrocities one might imagine. The Filartiga district court
conveyed the nature of the horror: "Spread upon the records of this
court is the evidence of wounds and of fractures, of burning and beat-
ing and of electric shock, of stabbing and whipping and of mutilation,
and finally, perhaps mercifully, of death, in short, of the ultimate in
human cruelty and brutality."'76
The factual record in Filartiga typifies the broader population of
successful ATCA cases. The court's resulting legal conclusions are
representative of that larger body of case law as well. Faced with such
gross deprivations of what every nation in the world considers to be
fundamental human rights, courts have permitted jurisdiction for
claims of torture, extrajudicial killings, prolonged arbitrary detention,
genocide, disappearance, and ancient law of nations violations. This
subsection tracks the case law's acceptance of these legal claims, re-
lates some of the more pertinent factual records, and identifies the
materials used by judges in considering the status of the norm
involved.
a. Official Torture
The firm basis of the Filartiga decision was built, in part, on the
solidity of the plaintiffs' particular international human rights claim.
Surviving family members of seventeen-year old Joel Filartiga sued a
Paraguayan Inspector General of Police for kidnapping and torturing
Joel to death.'77 Official torture, the Second Circuit held, constituted
an unambiguous violation of the law of nations.' 78 While Filartiga
may be noted for the strength of the underlying human rights claim, it
is no exception in this regard. Plaintiffs in other § 1350 cases have
filed suit for similar instances of extreme brutality at the hands of offi-
176. Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 866 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
177. Id. at 861.
178. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[T]here are few, if
any, issues in international law today on which opinion seems to be so united as the
limitations on a state's power to torture persons held in its custody.").
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cials.17 9 Similarly, strong judicial pronouncements concerning the
legal status of the prohibition of official torture have followed. 18°
Notably, the Filartiga court's method of analyzing the international
law claims has also become the routine judicial method. The Second
Circuit's conclusions rested on its assessment of "the universal con-
demnation of torture in numerous international agreements, and the
179. In Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), the plaintiff
cited treatment that he suffered during more than a year's imprisonment at a security
camp. There, under the direction of the defendant, "security officers beat him and
administered electric shocks to his body, particularly to his genitals, sometimes as
often as three times a night." 921 F. Supp. at 1191 (citation omitted); see also Abebe-
Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996) (security chief personally supervised and
directly participated in torture of female plaintiffs, including ordering each woman to
be stripped naked, bound by her hands and feet, hung from a pole, beaten severely,
blood and vomit-soaked cloth stuffed in her mouth to suppress screams, and water
poured over her wounds to increase pain); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human
Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1996) (personal interrogation by Ferdinand
Marcos; water torture; seven months in hot, unlit cell; five years in solitary confine-
ment, shackled and severely beaten); In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, Human
Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 495-96 (9th Cir. 1992) (kidnapping, interrogation, and tor-
turing to death of politically outspoken individual). In a recent 11th Circuit district-
level decision, Paul v. Avril, the following acts were left undisputed by the defendant
Haitian Lieutenant General Prosper Avril:
These include acts such as severe beatings, being dragged up flights of stairs,
having lit cigarettes inserted in the nostrils, being put in contortionist posi-
tions while beaten with particular attention being paid to the skull and groin,
refusal to administer medical treatment, being paraded on national televi-
sion and falsely accused of being involved in an assassination plot, deliberate
starvation and other equally indescribable acts of unmerciful treatment.
812 F. Supp. 207, 209 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
In Avril, however, the plaintiff sued under multiple claims, including torture; cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment; arbitrary arrest and detention without trial. Id. at
209. Since these claims were left undisputed, one might semantically question which
of the abuses would have fit directly under the rubric of "torture." We give brief
treatment to such considerations below. See infra text accompanying notes 180-88.
Here, however, the point is to reveal the facts that drive these cases; which, in turn,
helps to explain how such indisputable illegalities inform courts' recognition that a
CIL violation has taken place. These hard-hitting facts expose the grave abuses that
the limited canon of jus cogens norms tries to arrest. They also demonstrate why no
country asserts the legal right to engage in such acts. Cabiri, 921 F. Supp. at 1198
(explaining "[the defendant] does not claim that the acts of torture he is alleged to
have committed fall within the scope of his authority. He does not argue that such
acts are not prohibited by the laws of Ghana; nor could he .... [N]o government
asserts a right to torture its citizens .... " (citing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884)). Most
importantly, the graphic nature of the factual records sheds a critical light on the
revisionists' contention that contemporary CIL is overly malleable. See Bradley &
Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24, at 838-42; Bradley & Gold-
smith, Human Rights Litigation, supra note 24, at 325-31.
180. See In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, 978 F.2d at 499 (explaining that it is
"unthinkable" to hold that official torture does not violate customary international
law) (citing Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir.
1992)); Cabiri, 921 F. Supp. at 1196 (alleged acts of the defendant violated -a funda-
mental principle of the law of nations: the human right to be free from torture");
Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1541 (expressing "no doubt" that official torture is cognizable
§ 1350 violation of law of nations).
1997]
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renunciation of torture as an instrument of official policy by virtually
all of the nations of the world ... ."I" The court specifically refer-
enced the United Nations Charter, 82 the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 183 and the U.N. General Assembly's unanimous Dec-
laration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to
Torture.'84 Considered together, these instruments helped prove the
universality, definability, and obligation of the norm.185 To substanti-
ate its finding, the court also relied on several sources of U.S. political
branch action, including: the Department of State's human rights re-
ports, 86 congressional statutes, 87 and, perhaps most importantly, the
amicus brief filed on behalf of the United States. 188 As the following
cases demonstrate, Filartiga's investigation of such international and
domestic legal instruments typifies the ways in which other CIL claims
are deemed actionable in federal court.' 89
181. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880.
182. Id. at 881-82 (explaining while "precise extent" of fundamental freedoms
under the Charter are disputable, "there is at present no dissent from the view that
the guarantees include, at a bare minimum, the right to be free from torture"); U.N.
Charter art. 55.
183. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 882 (discussing Universal Declaration's prohibition as
stated in "the plainest of terms"); see Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
184. Filartiga, 630 F.2d. at 882; see Declaration on the Protection of All Persons
from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 91,
U.N.Doc. A/10034 (1975).
185. The court did not find that any of these instruments, alone, established the
binding principle against torture, but rather each was taken as "evidence of" the
norm. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880 n.7; id. at 882 n.9.
186. Id. at 884 (quoting Dept. of State, Country Reports on Human Rights for 1979,
in House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, and Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th
Cong. (Joint Comm. Print 1980)).
187. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884-85 n.17 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) and 22 U.S.C.
§ 2151(a)). These statutes were cited more for the proposition that international law
establishes personal fundamental rights, not for the proposition regarding torture
specifically.
188. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884; cf. In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, Human
Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 499-500 (dismissing defendant's claim that intervening acts
of legislative and executive branches since Filartiga should forestall this holding).
189. Notably, the reasoning in Filartiga may also be contrasted with other cases in
which a proposed CIL norm fails the test, such as the prohibition of nonofficial tor-
ture. In particular, contrasting the Filartiga opinion with Judge Edward's discussion
of nonofficial torture in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791-95 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring), demonstrates both the importance of the tripar-
tite test as well as the influence of Sabbatino in such evaluations. Invoking Sabba-
tino's sliding scale, Judge Edwards found the requisite degree of universal consensus
lacking:
[H]eeding the warning of the Supreme Court in Sabbatino, to wit, "the
greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area
of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render
decisions regarding it." I am not prepared to extend the definition of the
"law of nations" absent direction from the Supreme Court. The degree of
"codification or consensus" is simply too slight.
Id. at 792 (citing Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428).
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b. Extrajudicial Killings
According to settled law, extrajudicial killings also constitute a judi-
cially cognizable violation of CIL. The most comprehensive articula-
tion of this norm's legal status is found in Ford v. Suarez-Mason I.190
The Ford I court was faced with a gruesome account of abduction,
torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, disappearance, and extrajudi-
cial killing. 9 ' In sorting through each of the legal claims, the court
applied the tripartite test for actionable CIL. The court concluded
that state-sponsored "murder and summary execution" are prohibited
under an international legal norm that is "universal, is readily defina-
ble, and is of course obligatory."' 92 This assessment was not contro-
By "too slight" Judge Edwards meant that a couple of international documents
suggested the international law of nonofficial torture had not reached a state of uni-
versal agreement. Id at 795 (discussing Report of the Working Group on a Draft
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, U.N. ESCOR, 37th Sess., 5th mtg., U.N. Doc. E/CN.41L 1576 (1981); and
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452, U.N.
GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34 at 91-92, U.N. Doc. A110034 (1975)). Accordingly,
Judge Edwards' opinion exemplifies the type of judicial reasoning that is generally
overlooked in the revisionist account. That is, courts confronted with some counter-
vailing evidence may hold that such claims lack the requisite degree of consensus.
The revisionists mischaracterize the prevailing judicial approach. They suggest that
judges adopt the reverse presumption, finding actionable CIL violations when
presented with even minimal international documentation. See Bradley & Goldsmith,
Customary International Law, supra note 24, at 838-42; Weisburd, State Courts, supra
note 24, at 9-11. Their account, however, fails to explain courts' general unwillingness
to find a new CIL claim. Moderate contrary indications can have a decisive impact on
any of the three parts of the "jus cogens test," especially for the showing of universal-
ity. See also Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 189 (D. Mass. 1995) ({"Vhile it is
true that blind adherence to formal labels should be avoided, caution is required in
identifying new violations of jus cogens. Thus, despite the compelling character of
plaintiffs' claims, I am reluctant to stretch the category of 'cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment' to encompass constructive expulsion." (citation omitted, paranthetical
quote omitted)).
190. Forti v. Suarez-Mason I, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
191. The plaintiffs, a sixteen year-old woman and her seventeen-year old brother,
were abducted from their bedroom by ununiformed military personnel. The young
woman was, first, held blindfolded and handcuffed for a week without food or cloth-
ing, and, subsequently, imprisoned without charge for more than four years. Id. at
1537. Her brother's body was returned to the family by the military personnel the day
after the their initial abduction. He had died of internal bleeding from bullet wounds;
his face severely disfigured from physical beatings. See id. Family members brought
suit under § 1350 on the basis of a number of CIL violations. The family sued for the
brother's death under the claim that a killing by state officials without any court pro-
cedure or other due process of law constituted a summary execution in violation of
the law of nations. See id. at 1537-38.
192. Id at 1542.
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versial.193 Rather, the Forti I court was able to rely on unambiguously
supportive opinions from other circuits in rendering its judgment. 194
c. Prolonged Arbitrary Detention
In Forti I, the federal district court also concluded that a nation's
prolonged arbitrary detention of its citizens violates CIL. 95 Such a
norm, in the court's assessment, has "sufficient consensus" and is "ob-
ligatory, and is readily definable.' 1 96 The court, first, distinguished
prolonged detention of uninvited aliens, which other cases have con-
cluded does not violate CIL.'97 In finding an actionable CIL norm
against prolonged arbitrary detention of a nation's own citizens, the
court relied on Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson's wide-ranging
analysis of the relevant international treaties, cases, and commenta-
ries.198 In confirmation of the Forti I court's reasoning, the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals has since agreed that prolonged arbitrary
detention constitutes an unequivocal law of nations violation. 199
d. Genocide
The prohibition against genocide represents another "easy case" in
ATCA litigation. In the leading case on the issue, Kadic v. Karadzic,
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit only had to assess the
defendant's argument that the universal prohibition against genocide
193. Xuncax, 886 F. Supp at 185. The court explained that:
[T]he practice of summary execution... [has] been met with universal con-
demnation and opprobrium .... An affidavit signed by twenty-seven widely
respected scholars of international law attests that every instrument or
agreement that has attempted to define the scope of international human
rights has 'recognized a right to life coupled with a right to due process to
protect that right.' And again, not only are the proscriptions of these acts
universal and obligatory, they are adequately defined to encompass the in-
stant allegations.
Id. (citations omitted).
194. Ford, 672 F. Supp. at 1539 (citing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d
774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring)); id. at 1542 ("[T]he right not to be
murdered [by the state] is among the 'basic rights' which 'have been put generally
accepted-and hence incorporated into the law of nations."' (quoting De Sanchez v.
Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1397 (5th Cir. 1985))).
195. Id. at 1541-42.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1541.
198. Id. (citing Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980),
affd 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981)). In Rodriguez-Fernandez, the federal district
court held that international law is part of the law of the United States which federal
courts are bound to ascertain and administer. Rodriguez-Fernandez, 505 F. Supp at
795-98.
199. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1996). The factual record of
these cases clearly fit within the definition of prolonged arbitrary detention and prob-
ably help drive the norm's acceptance. See, e.g., id. at 795 (holding that one plaintiff's
seven years of solitary confinement "clearly meet the definition of prolonged arbi-
trary detention"; and other plaintiff's more than four years of house arrest without
charge "clearly come within the definition of prolonged arbitrary detention").
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did not apply to private actors.'c° The court held that the CIL prohi-
bition against genocide applied to state actors and nonstate actors,
alike . 0
1
Chief Judge Newman, writing for the court, referenced executive
branch statements, congressional enactments and international instru-
ments, all of which pointed to the same conclusion. The court relied
on the Executive Branch's submitted statement in the case as well as
historical material reflecting earlier executive positions.' Indeed,
the Department of Justice's brief outlined a clear position against the
defendant"0 3 Chief Judge Newman, in further discussing the specific
prohibition of genocide, based his analysis on three pillars of interna-
tional law-the unanimous 1946 General Assembly Resolution defin-
ing and condemning acts of genocide,"0' the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal, 05 and the Genocide Convention itself.20 6 Each
of these documents included the United States as a signatory state,
and each confirmed that the prohibition against genocide encom-
passed private actors.20 7 Consequently, the court concluded that the
200. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
201. Id. at 242. The court's holding has been followed in Beanal v. Freeport-
McMoran, 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997), and Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, No.
94 Civ. 3627, 1996 WL 164496, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1996) (torture and summary
execution as part of coordinated genocide effort by nonstate actors constituted action-
able CIL claim). In Beanal, however, the district court gave the plaintiff leave to
amend his complaint. 969 F. Supp. at 384. The plaintiff had alleged that the defendant
was destroying the Amungme culture. The court explained that genocide, as univer-
sally defined, only applies to destruction of groups and their members (e.g., the
Amungme people), not the group's culture. Id. at 372-73.
202. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239-40 (relying on Breadi of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57,
59 (1795) (Att'y Gen. Bradford) and Statement of Interest of the United States,
Kadic, 70 F.3d at 232).
203. The Department of Justice did not equivocate:
Article 4 of the Genocide Convention... [includes] 'persons committing
genocide whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public offi-
cials, or private individuals.' And... the various Geneva Conventions of
1949 ... apply to all parties to an armed conflict, whether or not they are
states. These conventions are thus reflective of customary international
law."
Statement of Interest of the United States at 10, Kadic, 70 F.3d at 232; see also id. at 5
("The [district] court concluded that 'acts committed by non-state actors do not vio-
late the law of nations.' The district court's conclusion is incorrect. Customary inter-
national law does not bind exclusively state actors. Depending upon the violation
alleged, acts committed by non-state actors may indeed violate international law."
(citation omitted)).
204. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241 (discussing G.A. Res. 96(I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., pt. 2
at 188-89, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (1946)).
205. Id. (discussing Agreement and Charter Establishing the Nuremberg War
Crimes Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279).
206. Id. at 241-42 (discussing Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (signed by
the U.S. Feb. 23, 1989) and Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 18
U.S.C. § 1091 (1988)) [hereinfter Genocide Convention].
207. Kadic, F.3d at 240-42. Notably, issues concerning non-self-executing treaties
(e.g., the Genocide Convention) involve a significant point of disagreement between
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plaintiffs' claims that Radovan Karadzic personally planned and or-
dered the murder, rape, and forced impregnation of Bosnian Muslims
and Bosnian Croats "clearly state[d]" a violation that fit within the
scope of the CIL concerning genocide.20
e. Disappearances
Disappearances constitute another well settled CIL claim under
§ 1350.209 Fori II contains the most comprehensive treatment of the
norm's status.210 The decision primarily involved determining
whether an international consensus existed on the norm's definition.
The court relied on several international legal sources in finding that
the revisionist position and modem position. The revisionists criticize the incorpora-
tion of such non self-executing treaties into domestic law. See Bradley & Goldsmith,
Customary International Law, supra note 24, at 858-59; Trimble supra note 24, at 727-
29.
The Kadic court provided one answer to this concern: Congress's decision not to
provide a private remedy under the Genocide Convention decidedly left other non-
conflicting statutes untouched; and "the legislative decision not to create a new pri-
vate remedy does not imply that a private remedy is not already available under the
Alien Tort Act." 70 F.3d at 242; see also Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847 (11th
Cir. 1996) ("[T]he 'committed in violation' language of the statute suggests that Con-
gress did not intend to require an alien plaintiff to invoke a separate enabling statute
as a precondition to relief under the Alien Tort Claims Act." (citations omitted)).
Furthermore, certain provisions of a treaty may contain expressions of CIL even in
the absence of U.S. ratification of the entire treaty. Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and
Process: International Law and How We Use It 28-29 (1994). Professor Higgins
writes:
[Wihile not being bound by all the particular provisions of the Genocide
Convention, no non-ratifying state could claim to be free to commit geno-
cide because it was not a party to that legal instrument. The prohibition
against genocide clearly pre-existed the Convention as a prohibition of cus-
tomary international law.
Id. at 29. For a description of the effects of self-executing and non self-executing
treaties in U.S. domestic law, see Restatement (Third), supra note, 14, at 111 cmt. h.
For a critique of the judicial construction of non self-executing treaties see Jordan J.
Paust, International Law as Law of the United States 51-64 (1996). For an extended
analysis of how treaties may not reflect all aspects of related jus cogens norms, see
Beth Van Schaack, The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the Genocide Conven-
tion's Blind Spot, 106 Yale L.J. 2259, 2272-77 (1997).
208. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242.
209. Admittedly, classifying disappearances within the category of incontrovertible
claims requires some qualification since the first ATCA court to decide the issue-the
district court in Forti 1-required an amended complaint and rehearing of the issue
before accepting the norm's status as CIL. However, the court's decision to request a
further submission of arguments was due to the plaintiff's original failure to provide
comprehensive evidence. Forti I, 672 F. Supp. at 1542-43. The court thus required
further briefing to decide specifically whether the prohibition against disappearances
included a universally-accepted definition of the norm. The court's subsequent deci-
sion, thus, represents the leading case in the area and has since been embraced with
congressional approval and has been relied upon as persuasive precedence in the Sec-
ond Circuit. See infra text accompanying note 261 (outlining approval of Forti H's
holding in legislative history of the TVPA); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 185
(D. Mass. 1995).
210. Forti v. Suarez-Mason II, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
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disappearances constitute "a universally recognized wrong under the
law of nations." '' These authorities included a prominent General
Assembly Resolution,212 the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,2 13 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,2 14
and a resolution of the Organization of American States.215 Other
documents included congressional statutory provisions that support
this consensus view.2 1 6 In sum, the court agreed that a universal and
obligatory prohibition exists against disappearances, thus resolving
two of the three prongs of the tripartite test.217 In sorting through the
legal instruments and submissions by numerous experts, the Ninth
Circuit recognized-in the words of Professor Thomas Franck-"[the
international community has also reached a consensus on the defini-
tion of a 'disappearance.' It has two essential elements: (a) abduction
by a state official or by persons acting under state approval or author-
ity; and (b) refusal by the state to acknowledge the abduction and
detention."21
f. Ancient Law of Nations Violations
Centuries-old CIL norms can establish a cause of action under the
ATCA. Judge Bork's Tel-Oren opinion acknowledged that universal
CIL norms with this ancient pedigree may properly fall within the
scope of the ATCA.21 9 In fact, Judge Bork took special care to note
several points of agreement between himself and the Filartiga court. 2
Judge Bork, however, applied an originalist interpretation to the law
of nations, effectively freezing the range of causes of action to ones
settled hundreds of years ago. Accordingly, in the wake of Tel-Oren,
the D.C. Circuit still permits ATCA suits to proceed if such a claim is
211. Id at 710.
212. The court relied on the General Assembly Resolution which declared -disap-
pearance" to be in violation of several provisions of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Forti II, 694 F. Supp. at 710 (citing G.A. Res 331173. U.N. GAOR, 33d
Sess., 90th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/33/PV.90 (Jan. 22, 1979)).
213. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. GAOR. 3rd Sess., G.A. Res.
217, at art. 3,5,9,10,11, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
214. Ford I1, 694 F. Supp. at 710 (citing International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 179, 6 I.L.M. 368, 375-76 (1967)).
215. Id. ("The Organization of American States has also denounced 'disappear-
ance' as 'an affront to the conscience of the hemisphere and ... a crime against hu-
manity."' (citing Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 666 (XIII-0183), O.A.S. GAOR, 7th Sess., O.A.S. Doc.
OEAISe.LIV/II.63 doc. 10 (Sept. 24, 1984) (on file with the Fordham Law Review)).
216. Id. (relying on 22 U.S.C. § 2304(d)(1)).
217. Id at 711-12.
218. Id. at 710 (quoting Thomas Franck).
219. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork,
J., concurring).
220. Id. at 819-20. Judge Bork's agreement with Filarriga notably included recogni-
tion that the prohibition of official torture constituted an "international law rule...
about which there is universal agreement 'in the modern usage of nations."' id., and
that international law is federal common law. Id. at 810.
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at issue.2 2 ' Specifically, in a post-Tel Oren D.C. district court case the
plaintiffs succeeded in their claim that the unlawful seizure, 35-year
detention, and possible death of a diplomat violated centuries-old law
of nations obligations establishing diplomatic immunity.222
Similar claims have succeeded in other circuits, including a notable
predecessor of Filartiga. In the 1961 case Adra v. Clift, the federal
district court held that the defendants' actions-falsifying passports in
the process of kidnapping and internationally transporting a child
across international borders-constituted a violation of long vener-
ated law of nations principles.21 More recently, a Ninth Circuit dis-
trict court decision held that a private actor's involvement in slave
trade-a CIL violation since the time of Blackstone-constituted an
actionable § 1350 violation.224 These types of ATCA claims remain an
undisputed and relatively uncomplicated area of the present litigation.
2. Hard Cases: Controvertible Jus Cogens Violations
The prohibition of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment is the
only international legal principle that we classify within the gray area
of actionable CIL; it is the only claim over which the federal courts
disagree.225 The norm, broadly speaking, satisfies the requirements of
221. Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp 246, 257
(D.D.C. 1985) ("It is clear that even under the narrowest of these standards proposed
in Tel-Oren, or adopted in other forums-§ 1350 provides this Court with subject mat-
ter jurisdiction to determine the liability for the injury that has resulted from the
violation of ... diplomatic immunity.").
222. Id. at 257 ("An accredited diplomat has been detained and held incommuni-
cado for more than 35 years; his whereabouts have been concealed; and the defendant
may have caused his death. There can be no clearer violation of the law of nations."
(emphasis added)); see also id. at 256 (explaining case as involving violations "of trea-
ties codifying the fundamental principle of diplomatic immunity, which has been uni-
versally recognized as binding since before the times of Blackstone and de Vattel.").
The Von Dardel decision also discusses Sabbatino's sliding-scale and explains that the
law of nations violations at hand "are so well established that judicial determination
... poses little or no threat to the doctrine of separation of powers." Id. at 258.
223. Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 865 (D. Md. 1961). Appearing 19 years before
Filartiga, this decision notably helped establish the Second Circuit's footing in the first
place. See Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 n.21 (2d Cir. 1980) (discussing
Adra, 195 F. Supp. at 857).
224. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70
F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[Tjhe inclusion of piracy and slave trade from an earlier
era.., demonstrates that the offenses of 'universal concern' include those capable of
being committed by non-state actors."); id. at 239 ("An early example of the applica-
tion of the law of nations to the acts of private individuals is the prohibition against
piracy .... Later examples are prohibitions against the slave trade and certain war
crimes." (citations omitted)); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 794
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) ("One strand of individual liability appar-
ently survived the 19th century swing toward statism-private responsibility for
piracy. It remained, with only a handful of other private acts, such as slave trading, as
a confutation of the general principle of statism.").
225. This statement requires a caveat: The First Circuit district court decision
which upheld a § 1350 claim under cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment partly dis-
tinguished the Ninth Circuit district court's contrary ruling due to congressional ratifi-
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universal condemnation and obligatory prohibition. Yet, questions re-
garding the definitional boundaries of the norm have limited its appli-
cation. While nations may agree that certain grotesque practices fall
within the category, they are unable to agree, with the requisite preci-
sion, on the definitional parameters of the norm involved.
Due to the problem of the norm's definability, a federal court re-
fused to accept such complaints altogether." 6 In Forti I, the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California initially rejected a
claim of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, but subsequently al-
lowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint and provide better evi-
dence supporting the definability of the norm." 7 On rehearing, the
plaintiffs in Forti 1 constructed an argument that cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment exists on a continuum of suffering with torture at
its extreme end.' That is, the plaintiffs developed criteria for system-
atically defining cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. Such crea-
tive lawyering is in tension with the underlying logic of § 1350
doctrine-that the criteria defining the content of the norm in ques-
tion must be universal and well-established. The district court accord-
ingly rejected the plaintiffs' argument, holding that cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment is not actionable under § 1350 without "consen-
sus in the international community as to the tort's content."2 9
In Xuncax v. Gramajo, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts considered,1 0 but ultimately rejected" 1 the analysis of
cation of international treaties, which had occurred in the interim. See infra text
accompanying notes 230-31. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
has subsequently expressed a view of the underlying norm which is in tension with its
lower federal court's judgment. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789, 794-95
(9th Cir. 1996).
226. Forti v. Suarez-Mason I, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1543 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
227. 1d. at 1543 ("Because this right lacks readily ascertainable parameters, it is
unclear what behavior falls within the proscription .... Lacking the requisite ele-
ments of universality and definability, this proposed tort cannot qualify as a violation
of the law of nations.").
228. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 711 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
229. See id. at 712 ("To be actionable under the Alien Tort Statute the proposed
tort must be characterized by universal consensus in the international community as
to its binding status and its content." (emphasis in original)). Recently, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit managed to sidestep the question of the norm's
definability by concluding that the plaintiffs' claims were already covered by torture
and prolonged arbitrary detention. Hiao, 103 F.3d at 795. The Hilao court, nonethe-
less, provided serviceable dicta supporting the norm's status as CIL, persuasive com-
mentary which may help substantiate the continuum theory proposed by the plaintiffs
in Ford HI Id. at 795 ("[T]he international conventions or declarations banning such
treatment indicate that 'torture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."' (quoting Declaration on the Pro-
tection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess.,
Supp. No. 34, at art. 1(2), U.N.Doc. A/10034 (1975)).
230. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 186 (D. Mass. 1995) (discussing Ford II,
694 F. Supp. at 712).
231. IM. at 187.
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Forti I. The district court accepted the plaintiffs' argument that, sub-
sequent to Forti II, the Senate ratification of, and specific reservations
to, both the Convention Against Torture and the ICCPR gave content
to the meaning of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. The Sen-
ate reservations stipulated that while the United States is bound by
the respective conventions to prevent cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment, such an obligation only means "cruel, unusual and inhu-
mane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. ' '2 32
The Xuncax court recognized that U.S. domestic law does not gov-
ern the international legal definition of the norm; such international
law would require universal-not only U.S-assent. 33 Nevertheless,
the court held that defining cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment in
accordance with related constitutional rights:
[D]oes not compel the conclusion that no aspect of the norm can
qualify as international law. Where American constitutional law
and international law overlap, the voice of this country as part of
the consensus rendering the proposition in question a rule of inter-
national law is simply embodied in domestic constitutional
directives.234
That is, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment includes actions that
are both universally condemned and specifically prohibited in U.S.
federal law. The court held that the claims alleged in the case clearly
met this criteria.235
In essence, the Xuncax court held that the scope of the interna-
tional norm against cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, while not
definable at its outer periphery, does contain, at its core, ascertainable
prohibitions. Hence, a district court in the First Circuit took a posi-
tion in contradistinction to the Ninth Circuit district court in Forti I.
The Forti 11 court had dismissed the claim under cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment because the norm, as a whole, was undefinable.
In contrast, the Xuncax court held that:
It is not necessary that every aspect of what might comprise a stan-
dard such as 'cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment' be fully de-
fined and universally agreed upon before a given action meriting
the label is clearly proscribed under international law, any more
than it is necessary to define all acts that may constitute 'torture' or
232. 136 Cong. Rec. S10093 (daily ed. July 19, 1990); 138 Cong. Rec. S4783 (daily
ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
233. Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 186.
234. Id. at 187.
235. Plaintiffs were all natives of Guatamala. They fled the country after being
victimized by Guatamalan military forces. Some of the plaintiffs were subject to tor-
ture and arbitrary detention; others were forced to watch as their family members
were tortured to death or summarily executed; one plaintiff's father "disappeared."
[Vol. 66
1997] HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS & U.S. LAW 509
'arbitrary detention' in order to recognize certain conduct as action-
able misconduct under that rubric.
236
3. Easy Cases Part II: Incontrovertible Non Jus Cogens Violations
Many plaintiffs have attempted to use the ATCA to forward various
claims that fall outside the well-accepted scope of federal CIL. The
ATCA-based part of nearly all of these complaints is frequently dis-
missed in less than three pages of the court reporter, often in less than
three paragraphs, and never with a dissenting opinion. Not all of the
claims that fail are this radically removed from the scope of the law of
nations, yet they suffer from fatal flaws under the tripartite test, and
no dissenting opinion has been filed in their favor. The list of rejected
claims includes: expropriation of property, fraud, negligence in air-
craft crashes" 7 and mismanaged sea vessels,238 free speech,239 libel,240
child custody law,24 and financial misconduct.242 We discuss expro-
priations and fraud only, since they serve as paradigmatic cases.
236. Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 186.
237. See Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1978)
(finding that no evidence supports the claim that negligence constitutes law of nations
violation).
238. See Damaskinos v. Societa Navigacion Interamericana, S.A., Pan., 255 F.
Supp. 919, 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ("Negligence in providing a seaman with a safe place
in which to work, and unseaworthiness of a vessel in that respect, are not violations of
the law of nations."); Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292, 294-95
(E.D. Pa. 1963) (noting doctrine of unseaworthiness that allowed compensation for
seamen beyond maintenance and cure was particular American principle not found
under law of nations); see also Khedivial Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 278
F.2d 49, 51-52 (2d Cir. 1960) (per curiam) (denying ATCA jurisdiction because un-
restricted right of access to harbors by vessels of all nations not a part of law of
nations).
239. See Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276,280 (S.D. Cal. 1986) ("However dearly
our country holds First Amendment rights ... a violation of the First Amendment
right of free speech does not rise to the level of such universally recognized rights and
so does not constitute a 'law of nations."').
240. See Akbar v. New York Magazine Co., 490 F. Supp. 60.63 (D.D.C. 1980) (-No
treaty concerning libel has been noted nor allegedly violated, and plaintiffs have not
alleged any violation of 'the law of nations' as the term has been interpreted by the
courts.").
241. See Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1978) ("[Tihe 'law of
nations,' to the extent that it speaks on the subject, does not demand a particular
substantive rule regarding custody of alien children.").
242. See Valanga v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 324, 328 (E.D. Pa.
1966) (stating that refusal of life insurance company to pay proceeds is not law of
nations violation nor approaches the "calibre of the cases" legitimately found under
§ 1350); cf. Cohen v. Hartman 634 F.2d 318, 319 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (holding
that converted funds between employer and employee does not involve (a) internal
relations nor (b) affect national sovereignty and thus "in no way" is a law of nations
violation).
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a. Expropriation of Private Property
The prohibition of the expropriation of property may arguably con-
stitute emerging CIL, but it is presently implausible for this legal prin-
ciple to satisfy the jus cogens standards under the ATCA doctrine. In
fact, the Filartiga court used the subordinate status of the proscription
of expropriation to contrast the obligatory and universally-accepted
status of the prohibition against torture. Filartiga explained that pro-
scriptions against expropriation could not satisfy CIL standards-
namely, the universality and obligatory prongs-in light of the
"sharply conflicting views" among different capital-exporting, capital-
importing, socialist-leaning, and capitalist-leaning countries. 43
Although Filartiga's discussion was dicta, another ATCA decision has
since reached a similar conclusion as part of its holding.244 In Jafari v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, the U.S. District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois granted a motion to dismiss, in part, because the plain-
tiff's expropriation claim clearly failed to satisfy the standards of
universality and binding obligation. 45
243. Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Sabbatino v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964)).
244. See Jafari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. IM. 1982). Read-
ers who are familiar with the case law may question why we do not also rely on Drey-
fits v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976), a prominent Second Circuit ATCA case
that courts frequently cite for the proposition that government expropriation does not
rise to the level of a law of nations violation. See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank
of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320, 325 n.16 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing Dreyfits, 534 F.2d at 30-31),
rev'd on other grounds 461 U.S. 480 (1983); Jafari, 539 F. Supp. at 215 (discussing
Dreyfius, 534 F.2d at 30-31); see also De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770
F.2d 1385, 1397 (5th Cir. 1985) (using-in context of FSIA-the Dreyfits decision as
an extreme example of expropriation taken pursuant to Nazi racial decrees not rising
to level of minimum human rights violation). In Dreyfits, however, the Court of Ap-
peals held that the law of nations operates primarily between states and never be-
tween a sovereign and its own nationals. 534 F.2d at 30-31. As a consequence,
Dreyfus does not hold that expropriation falls short of CIL's standard of universality.
Furthermore, the Dreyfis holding contributes very little to post-Filartiga CIL deter-
minations. Dreyfus' commitment to a state-to-state conception of the law of nations
represented a conceptual holdover from pre-Nuremberg years, and, as such, has since
been narrowed. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884 ("Accordingly, we must conclude that the
dictum in Dreyfus v. Von Finck to the effect that 'violations of international law do
not occur when the aggrieved parties are nationals of the acting state,' is clearly out of
tune with the current usage and practice of international law." (citation omitted)).
Ironically, the Filartiga court, while overruling Dreyfus in this manner, also cites the
opinion for the incorrect proposition. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 888 n.23 (distinguishing
Dreyfuts based on consensus of opinion regarding norm of torture from that of expro-
priation) ("Dreyfius v. Von Finck concerned a forced sale of property, and thus sought
to invoke international law in an area in which no consensus view existed." (citations
omitted)). A closer reading of the Dreyflis opinion shows that this latter proposition
depended on explicit-though outmoded-supposition that states are the only appro-
priate juridical subjects of international law.
245. See Jafari, 539 F. Supp. at 215. The court explained:
It may be foreign to our way of life and thought, but the fact is that govern-
mental expropriation is not so universally abhorred that its prohibition com-
mands the "general assent of civilized nations" a prerequisite to
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b. Fraud
Three ATCA cases have confronted and dismissed claims that fraud
constitutes a law of nations violation.246 Plaintiffs have based the
plausibility of their claim on the contention that all nations consider
fraud immoral and illegal.2 47 Judge Friendly, in fIT v. Vencap, Ltd.,
concisely responded to the argument: "We cannot subscribe to plain-
tiffs' view that the Eighth Commandment 'Thou shalt not steal' is part
of the law of nations."'  According to Judge Friendly, a law of na-
tions violation is based on mutual-not merely several-concern of
the community of nations.2 4 9 Fraud so clearly falls outside of this
framework that it has received short shrift from the federal courts.25
incorporation in the "law of nations .... " [A] sharp conflict of views exists
in the world as to such expropriation .... We cannot elevate our American-
centered view of governmental taking of property without compensation
into a rule that binds all "civilized nations."
Id. (citations omitted); see also Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276,280 n.1 (S.D. Cal.
1986) ("While there is no consensus on what constitutes a violation of the 'law of
nations,' in one area there appears to be a consensus. A taking or expropriation of a
foreign national's property by his government is not cognizable under § 1350."); cf.
De Sanchez, 770 F.2d at 1397 (discussing expropriations under exceptions of FSIA,
the court wrote that "the standards of human rights that have been generally accepted
- and hence incorporated into the law of nations-are still limited. They encompass
only such basic rights as the right not to be murdered, tortured, or otherwise sub-
jected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment .... At present, the taking by a
state of its national's property does not contravene the international law of minimum
human rights."); id. at 1397 n.16 (collecting several ATCA and non-ATCA cases hold-
ing that expropriations do not contravene law of nations).
246. See liT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975) (involving action for
fraud, conversion, and corporate waste); Abiodun v. Martin Oil Service. Inc., 475 F.2d
142 (7th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (involving fraud in procuring workers from foreign
country); Trans-Continental Inv. Corp., S.A. v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 500 F.
Supp. 565 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (concerning fraudulent misrepresentation to receive $2.5
million deposit in bank).
247. Trans-Continental Inv. Corp., 500 F. Supp. at 570; lT, 519 F.2d at 1015; Abi-
odun, 475 F.2d at 145 (plaintiff contending that "fraud is considered immoral and
unlawful by all nations and thus is a violation of the law of nations").
248. 519 F.2d at 1015.
249. See id.; see also Trans-Continental Inv. Corp., 500 F. Supp. at 570 (explaining
that despite fact that fraud is a universally recognized tort. "universal recognition
does not, per se, make the rule a part of 'the law of nations"'). The element of mutual
concern is arguably covered under the tripartite standard of universal obligation that
Filartiga first articulated in the ATCA context. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 888-89 (dis-
cussing, and possibly qualifying, HT's test for mutual concern).
250. In Abiodun, for example, the court granted the motion to affirm-without oral
argument-the lower court's summary judgment, and rejected the law of nation's
claim in one paragraph. Abiodwi, 475 F.2d at 145-46 ("[T]here is simply no basis for
claiming a violation of the law of nations."). The Trans-Continental Investment court
expended four paragraphs on the issue, 500 F. Supp. at 569-70, and, in 11T, Judge
Friendly spent one. 11T, 519 F.2d at 1015.
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D. Lessons from the Litigation
Several insights can be drawn from the Filartiga case line. First, the
incorporation of Sabbatino's sliding-scale-and the tripartite test
which follows from it-validates the modern position's understanding
of the Supreme Court's holding. Properly interpreted, Sabbatino
stands both for the proposition that international law is federal com-
mon law and for the proposition that courts should refrain from adju-
dicating international law claims without the requisite degree of
codification or international consensus. Second, and as a corollary
point, the structure of the litigation illuminates the distinction be-
tween international law, in general, and actionable CIL. The latter
category-which occupies a preferred status in Sabbatino's sliding
scale-contains those claims appropriate for federal judicial determi-
nation. The tripartite limiting principle helps ensure that courts "fo-
cus on the application of an agreed principle to circumstances of fact
rather than on the sensitive task of establishing a principle not incon-
sistent with the national interest or with international justice."'2 51
Third, a thorough account of the prevailing judicial practice of find-
ing and applying CIL demonstrates the systematic nature of these in-
quiries. The availability of ample documents and international legal
instruments enables effective adjudication of the status of CIL. More-
over, the uniform results in the case law belie the revisionist portrayal
of CIL as "often unwritten... unsettled ... difficult to verify"2 '' and
the "contours [of which] are often uncertain. 2 53 At worst, such traits
might be fairly attributed to the boundary between emergent CIL and
established CIL. These characteristics cannot, however, be fairly at-
tributed to justiciable CIL; that is jus cogens CIL. Guided by Sabba-
tino's articulation of the proper role of courts, CIL's incorporation
into federal common law is limited to universal, definable, and obliga-
tory norms-the incontrovertible, easy cases. Aspects of CIL which
are "difficult to verify" or "uncertain" do not survive the rigorous
standards articulated by federal courts.
Finally, the structure of the modern litigation informs the remainder
of this article. The following part discusses recent congressional ac-
251. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964). In Sabbatino,
the court declared that expropriations occupied an ambiguous status in international
law and, as such, pronouncements on and enforcement of such issues should be com-
mitted to the political branches. See id. A similar framework for approaching such
issues informed the Congress's enactment of the TVPA (and its concurrent endorse-
ment of the Filartiga doctrine). That is, dissenting members of Congress expressed
trepidation that the judiciary would make pronouncements on international human
rights issues in foreign affairs. The majority of Congress overrode these concerns, in
signficant part because torture-a universal and unambiguous CIL-did not present
such political or ideological concerns.
252. Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24, at 855.
253. Id. at 858; see also Weisburd, State Courts, supra note 24, at 9 (stating that
rights and duties under customary international law are difficult to define).
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tion regarding the Filartiga doctrine. The contours of the modern liti-
gation served as the background for the TVPA congressional
deliberations and, consequently, received significant treatment in the
committee reports. Congress, fully appreciating the more than dec-
ade-long expansion of the case law, clearly expressed its intention to
leave these precedential developments undisturbed. Accordingly, the
TVPA and its legislative history informs our evaluation of the revi-
sionist position.
III. CONGRESSIONAL ENDORSEMENT OF THE MODERN POSITION:
EVALUATING THE REVISIONIST POSITION IN LIGHT OF
THE TVPA
In March 1992, Congress provided a clear political branch signal:
passage of the Torture Victim Protection Act as a statutory supple-
ment to the ATCA. 4 The importance of this legislation for evaluat-
ing the revisionist position should not be underestimated. The
revisionist project argues that the causes of action under the current
Filartiga doctrine are constitutionally suspect without proper political
branch authorization. Our discussion of the TVPA and its legislative
history demonstrates that the political branch authorization-if re-
quired-has been given. In this part, we assess the revisionists' rea-
sons for engaging in the radical rethinking of CIL's status as federal
common law, given that this area of the case law is immune from the
revisionist critique taken on its own terms. 55
Our analysis of the TVPA also raises other issues. Specifically, we
argue that Congress's own conception of its institutional role belies
the revisionist claim that the federal judiciary has unduly usurped leg-
islative powers. Our treatment of the TVPA's legislative history also
demonstrates that the Filartiga line does not "depart from well-ac-
cepted notions of American representative democracy, federal com-
254. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73,
(1992) codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994) (hereinafter TVPA). According to the leg-
islators, they intended the TVPA both to strengthen and clarify the ATCA by
enumerating two particular human rights violations-official torture and extrajudicial
killing-and by extending the potential plaintiff class to include American citizens.
See Torture Vctim Protection Act of 1989, Hearings Before the Subconmn. on Iminigra-
tion & Refugee Affairs of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciar', 101st Cong. 36 (1990)
[hereinafter Senate TVPA Hearings], at 36 (describing TVPA as "simply an extension
and 'clarification"' of Filartiga).
255. In a sense, this part of our Article subjects the revisionist project to a fatal test:
If we suspend the conventional wisdom that CIL is part of federal common law and
adopt, in full, the revisionist default rule-that CIL is not federal law without a polit-
ical branch signal-what affect does that have on the only line of cases relying upon
the modem position? That is, if we assume, for the sake of argument, that "CIL is not
supreme federal law unless the federal political branches say so," does that actually
disturb the Filartiga line of cases? See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary' International
Law, supra note 24, at 862. The legislative history of the TVPA suggests not. In this
part, we analyze the implications of the TVPA/ATCA interplay for the potential ap-
plicability of the revisionist claim to case law outside § 1350.
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mon law, separation of powers, and federalism. 256 In passing the
TVPA, Congress completed a fourfold endeavor: Congress (1) issued
a statement of support for the entire Filartiga line of cases, (2) specifi-
cally enumerated two human rights violations as cognizable § 1350
causes of action, (3) affirmatively sanctioned the incorporation of cus-
tomary international human rights law as a matter of federal common
law, and (4) rebuffed recalcitrant judges for not already having done
the same.
A. The Central Importance of the TVPA
After March 1992, the political branches' position on Filartiga and
its progeny leaves little to imagination. Both Houses of Congress re-
sponded directly to Judge Bork's failure to follow the Filartiga line,
passing the TVPA by overwhelming majorities. Congress intended
the TVPA not to replace, but rather to solidify and extend, the
ATCA's coverage." Accordingly, Congress stipulated two specific
causes of action-official torture and extrajudicial killing-and pur-
posefully left the ATCA intact to continue the broader Filartiga doc-
trine's causes of action.
The TVPA and its legislative history should dissolve many of the
concerns raised by the revisionist position. Yet, the TVPA receives
only brief mention in the revisionist critique, albeit as an exemplary
exercise of appropriately congressional authority. This concession for
the TVPA, however, does not admit to its direct connections to the
Filartiga progeny. The TVPA and its legislative history provide spe-
cific evidence of congressional authorization of the Filartiga doctrine,
and its codification at § 1350 should not be underestimated.258
Evaluating the Filartiga doctrine and the validity of causes of action
under the ATCA requires a close consideration of the TVPA. 259 Not
only is the TVPA the most analogous statute to which courts would
resort for clarification,260 but Congress deliberately attempted to have
the TVPA support the ATCA and its attendant litigation. Also, as
Congress periodically recodifies § 1350, the significant discussion re-
garding the ATCA provides an understanding of the contemporary
legislative intent behind the law. This significance of the TVPA is well
recognized by federal courts. In ATCA cases, several decisions have
256. Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24, at 821.
257. As law of nations violations, official torture and extrajudicial killings are now
undeniable subsets of § 1350's causes of action. See supra notes 178 and 192 and ac-
companying text.
258. Cf. Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (recognizing im-
portance of TVPA's codification at § 1350 for interpretive purposes).
259. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 172 n.2 (D. Mass. 1995) ("[T]he legisla-
tive history of the TVPA also casts light on the scope of the Alien Tort Claims Act
260. See, e.g., id. at 189-91 (using TVPA as most analogous federal statute to ATCA
for questions of statute of limitations).
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already relied on the TVPA to assess the acceptable contours of
causes of action under § 1350 and the broader Filartiga doctrine.2 "6
B. The TVPA's Satisfaction of the Revisionist Default Rule
This section casts the greatest doubt on the revisionists' invitation to
abandon the well-accepted modern position on CIL. The TVPA em-
bodies the very act of incorporation by the federal political branches
that, according to the revisionist default rule, should effectively pre-
serve § 1350's incorporation of CIL into federal law.2 62 This section
demonstrates that the TVPA not only directly incorporates two spe-
cific customary international human rights violations, but that it also
sanctifies the continued adjudication of other similar-though
unenumerated-human rights violations in accordance with Filartiga's
holding. The results of this analysis therefore put into question the
need to embark on the revisionists' endeavor at all, since the state of
the law would literally remain the same.
As previously mentioned, this section also argues that Filarniga, as a
wellspring for the modern position, abides by "well-accepted notions
of American representative democracy, federal common law, separa-
tion of powers, and federalism." '263 As we point out in this section,
and evaluate more fully in our conclusion, 2 1 Congress greeted Filar-
tiga's view of federal common law with approval.' 5 The Senate,
whose members most directly represent the fifty states at the federal
level, subscribes to the modem position.26  Additionally, no U.S.
state has claimed the prerogative to define its own interpretation of
261. See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that
"in enacting the TVPA, Congress endorsed the Filartiga line of cases"); Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241 (2d Cir. 1996) (relying on legislative history to show Con-
gress's intent for continuing other ATCA causes of action); In re Estate of Ferdinand
Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing tripartite
test for law of nation violations and stating that "[o]ur reading of the plain text of
§ 1350 is confirmed by the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, codified at this
section" (citation omitted)); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, 969 F. Supp. 362, 380
(E.D. La. 1997) ("The legislative history of the TVPA and recent case law stand for
the.., proposition that the TVPA codifies and expands the remedies available under
§ 1350."); id. ("Congress clearly meant for 'other norms' and future rules of interna-
tional customary law to be redressable under § 1350." (quoting H. Rep. No. 102-
367(I), (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86 [hereinafter House Report]));
Xuncax, 886 F. Supp 172 n.2 (stating "the legislative history of the TVPA also casts
light on the scope of the Alien Tort Claims Act"); id at 191 (discussing TVPA Senate
Report in connection with other causes of action).
262. Cf Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24, at
856-57 (discussing problems with recognizing CIL as a part of federal common law).
263. Id. at 821; see also id. at 857 ("[T]he modern position that CIL is federal com-
mon law is in tension with basic notions of American representative democracy.").
264. See discussion infra Part V.
265. See infra text accompanying notes 273-75.
266. See infra text accompanying note 278.
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actionable CIL-such as whether torture, extrajudicial killing, or ge-
nocide should be legal.2 67
On its face, the TVPA textually incorporates elements of CIL, sub-
components of which are left to broader judicial interpretation.
Under section 2, an individual acting under the color of law of a for-
eign nation who subjects a person to torture or extrajudicial killing
may be held liable. 68 In defining this section, the congressional plan
is that international law should infuse the meaning of the pertinent
terms. Specifically, the section of the statute that defines torture and
extrajudicial killings, does so by reference to CIL standards.269 The
definition of torture is directly taken, almost verbatim, from the Tor-
ture Convention. Also, the Senate Report discusses the Convention,
at significant length, and expressly states that the Act is designed to
fulfill the United States obligations under it.2 70
The scope and general understanding of extrajudicial killing is also
governed by standards of international law. First, the statute's con-
cept of extrajudicial killings is derived from Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions.2  Second, a critical clause anticipates judicial
application and interpretation of unlawful killing as defined "under
international law."'272 The clause was drafted into the statute for spe-
cific reasons; in the congressional hearings leading up to the Act, cer-
tain legislators were concerned that extrajudicial killings might
encompass arguably legitimate state-sponsored deaths, such as the le-
galized use of deadly force. The legal expert, to whom this concern
was posed, advised the Senate committee that the problem could be
resolved by having the statute refer either to national or international
laws. The statute, in its final form, stipulates that the term "extrajudi-
cial killing" shall "not include any such killing that, under interna-
tional law, is lawfully carried out under the authority of a foreign
nation."273 Thus, the Congress, ultimately decided to define the scope
of this exemption by incorporating international law directly and,
more remarkably, exclusively, instead of the other two suggested al-
ternatives (defining the exemption according to solely domestic law or
both domestic and international law).
267. See infra text accompanying notes 295-96.
268. See TVPA, supra note 254, at § 1350(2)(a)(1)-(2).
269. See House Report, supra note 261, at 4 ("[The TVPAJ defines 'torture' and
'extrajudicial killing' in accordance with international standards.").
270. S. Rep. No. 102-249, at 3 (1991) [hereinafter Senate Report].
271. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, art. 3. Congress also
utilized the definition of "extrajudicial killing" found in the Geneva Conventions. See
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Senate Report, supra
note 270, at 6.
272. TVPA, supra note 254, at § 1350(3)(a).
273. Id.
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With the addition of the TVPA, § 1350's references to CIL now ex-
emplify a range of degrees of specifications. The entire distinction be-
tween legal and extrajudicial killings arguably turns on its exemption
clause which refers the judiciary to more open-ended international
law. Furthermore, the statute's reference to lawful killing as defined
"under international law" remarkably resembles the "law of nations"
provision of the 1790 statute that the revisionists admit satisfies their
default rule.274 The degree of specification in the definition of extra-
judicial killings and this eighteenth century statute also shares obvious
affinities with the First Congress's design of the ATCA's "law of na-
tions" clause. As such, the capacity of both the TVPA and the 1790
statute to clear the revisionist default rule should confirm the similar
capacity of the ATCA.
The revisionists' endorsement of the TVPA and their corresponding
lack of a limiting principle for such degrees of statutory specification
leaves their position in a quandary. According to the Supreme Court
(as well as Congress), such open-ended statutory provisions, though
engines for common law interpretation, are the products of legislative
prerogative. 275
274. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24, at 819
& n.24 (discussing Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. 113, 113-14 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1651 (1994))).
275. In the 1820 case United States v. Smith, the Court upheld a congressional stat-
ute that authorized the judiciary to interpret and apply "the crime of piracy, as de-
fined by the law of nations." 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 153 n.(a) (1820) (quoting Act of
the 3d of March 1819, § 5). The Court explained that Congress possessed the prerog-
ative to decide how much definitional leeway to provide, id. at 158-59; and, therefore,
the Court upheld the statute despite having recently decided United States v. Hudson,
the case that is commonly thought of as Erie's progenitor in this area of law. United
States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812) (announcing the end to federal crimi-
nal common law and, as such, erecting a similar barrier to judicial rulemaking as that
performed by Erie). Writing for the majority, Justice Story conveyed this lesson:
Criticisms of judicial common law, exercised pursuant to broadly worded statutory
clauses, must propose an effective limiting principle or else they engulf most all stat-
utes with both lesser and greater degrees of linguistic specification. Smith, 18 U.S. at
160. In Smith, the statutory clause, "as defined by the law of nations," was Congress's
choice of degree of specification; therefore, Hudson's mandate against courts' inde-
pendently fashioning a common law of crimes was inapplicable. Id. at 153 n.(a).
Smith's ruling holds true for today: "[O]bjections to Congress's use of the courts to
formulate federal law are properly directed to Congress, rather than imposed upon
Congress by the Supreme Court." Field, Sources of Law, supra note 38, at 938.
The connection between Smith's holding and the ATCA runs even deeper. Nota-
bly, the Court illustrated its argument by use of the same 1790 statute that the revi-
sionists cite as satisfying their default rule. Smith, 18 U.S. at 158. This fact ties the
connection between the 1790 statute and the ATCA even tighter. That is, the statute
the revisionists endorse shares similar judicial rulemaking concerns as the statute in
Smith. Those statutory concerns-and the resolution of those concerns-have also
been directly linked to the ATCA. That is, the Supreme Court has subsequently
directy tied the lesson of Smith's holding to the degree of statutory specification of
§ 1350. In Ex parte Qurin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), a unanimous Court upheld a congres-
sional statute that granted jurisdiction to military commissions for trials of noncitizens
under offenses committed in violation of the "precepts of the law of nations, and more
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Section 1350 case law, in fact, benefits from clear congressional
statements regarding the judiciary's use of federal common law. Most
significantly, the Senate Report for the TVPA clearly anticipates and
encourages the continued judicial incorporation of international
human rights law as an enclave of federal common law:
While the legislation specifically provides Federal districts [sic]
courts with jurisdiction over these suits, it does not preclude state
courts from exercising their general jurisdiction to adjudicate the
same type of cases. As a practical matter, however, state courts are
not likely to be inclined or well-suited to consider these cases. Inter-
national human rights cases predictably raise legal issues-such as in-
terpretations of international law-that are matters of Federal common
law and within the particular expertise of Federal courts.276
Due to the expansive scope of this congressional statement and the
legal significance of actually grafting the TVPA as part of the statutory
notes for § 1350, it would require heroics in judicial activism to deny
this excerpt's direct application to the ATCA. The statement is also
buttressed by other expressions of clear support for the modern posi-
tion, including explicit approval of Filartiga's original holding.2 77
Senate statements, in particular, create particular difficulties for the
revisionist account. The Senate is the political organ that most di-
particularly the law of war." Id. at 28. The Court, in strong terms, first, rejected the
contention that Congress could not incorporate the law of war and leave its interpre-
tation to the common law of courts and, second, rejected the contention that the
courts could not dutifully exercise such authority:
It is no objection that Congress in providing for the trial of such offenses has
not itself undertaken to codify that branch of international law or to mark its
precise boundaries, or to enumerate or define by statute all the acts which
that law condemns. An Act of Congress punishing "the crime of piracy, as
defined by the law of nations" is an appropriate exercise of its constitutional
authority, Art. I, § 8, cl. 10, "to define and punish" the offense, since it has
adopted by reference the sufficiently precise definition of international law.
United States v. Smith. Similarly, by the reference in the 15th Article of War
to "offenders or offenses that ... by the law of war may be triable by such
military commissions," Congress has incorporated by reference, as within
the jurisdiction of military commissions, all offenses which are defined as
such by the law of war, and which may constitutionally be included within
that jurisdiction. Congress had the choice of crystallizing in permanent form
and in minute detail every offense against the law of war, or of adopting the
system of common law applied by military tribunals so far as it should be
recognized and deemed applicable by the courts. It chose the latter course.
Id. at 29-30 (citations omitted). As shown in this excerpt, the Court relied on Smith as
its first basis of precedence. And, to help seal its argument, the Court cited the
ATCA, by attaching a footnote, and quoting it as the first statutory example to prove
the stated legal principles. Id. at 30 n.6. This direct connection, though in dicta, dem-
onstrates the Court's acknowledgment of the relevance of Smith's (and now Ex parte
Quirin's) lesson for the ATCA. The ATCA, as a statute similar in kind to the statutes
in both these cases, should similarly survive judicial rulemaking concerns due to its
congressional pedigree. Concerns with such open-endedness should be taken up with
the statute's creators-the political branches.
276. Senate Report, supra note 270, at n.6 (emphasis added).
277. Id. at 3-4.
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rectly represents the interests of the states. Yet, these elected repre-
sentatives, whose interests the revisionist position argues are
undermined by the federal common law of CIL,278 report that "state
courts are not likely to be inclined or well-suited to consider these
cases."2 79 Indeed, the Report's statement suggests that the Senate ad-
heres to the broader view that international human rights cases, in
general, should be construed as an enclave of federal common law. In
short, a federalism concern is conspicuously lacking.
Congress's stance on these issues is not limited to cases of official
torture and extrajudicial killing. In passing the TVPA, Congress certi-
fied the political branches' approval that other universally condemned
human rights violations should continue to be applied by federal
courts under the Filartiga doctrine.'& The revisionist position offers a
different account-that the TVPA, "[b]y creating a federal cause of
action for torture.., arguably provides a basis for federal question
jurisdiction for suits involving torture." ' The statute and its legisla-
tive history, however, demonstrate a congressional commitment to a
range of causes of action, some enumerated-i.e., torture and extraju-
dicial killings-and some not.
In the revisionist account, the TVPA is presented as one of the ex-
emplary acts in which Congress may incorporate "select aspects of
CIL into federal statutory law," thus preserving the appropriate
role for the political branches. In contrast, the legislative history con-
278. Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24, at 857
("[T]he modem position that CIL is federal common law is in tension with basic no-
tions of American representative democracy.").
279. See text accompanying note 292.
280. Congress, heeding the possibility of misinterpretation, explained that the spec-
ification of the two particular violations does not exhaust the list of potential claims
under § 1350. House Report, supra note 261, at 86; Senate Report, supra note 270, at
3.
Admittedly, other commentators, in anticipation of the TVPA, suggested that the
congressional enactment of the TVPA would limit § 1350 to these two enumerated
causes of action. See, eg., Kathryn L. Pryor, Does the Torture Victini Protection Act
Signal the Demise of the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 29 Va. J. Int'l L. 969, 1024 (1989).
With the advantage of hindsight, these views can now be understood as premature
assessments of the TVPA. Pryor's article, for instance, appeared one year before the
Senate hearings on the issue; two years before the publication of the legislative his-
tory reports from the House Judiciary Committee and the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee; and three years before the enactment of the law. One could be misled about the
currency of Pryor's position due to a recent law review article which uses her argu-
ment as a scarecrow but misdates the article as 1991. Christopher W. Haffke, The
Torture Victim Protection Act: More Symbol Than Substance, 43 Emory L.I. 1467,
1481 n.71 (1994).
281. Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24, at 873
n.356 (citing Weisburd, State Courts, supra note 24, at 3-4); Weisburd, State Courts,
supra note 24, at 56 ("Congress can enact statutes creating federal causes of action for
violations of international law, as it has done with respect to torture, for example.").
282. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24,
at 819 & n.24, with Weisburd, State Courts, supra note 24, at 873; see also Bradley &
Goldsmith, Human Rights Litigation, supra note 24, at 365.
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firms that Congress adopted a different view of its capacities and incli-
nations. Congress manifested a clear (and the Senate, for its part,
most emphatically) satisfaction both with the loose degree of specifi-
cation in § 1350 and with the concomitant exercise of ongoing federal
court interpretation of the respective international legal principles.
After 1992, judges who wish to adhere to congressional intentions in
§ 1350 suits should feel relatively free to incorporate customary inter-
national norms in addition to those of torture and extrajudicial killing.
In passing the TVPA, Congress perceived its task to be one of laying
to rest the persisting question of whether the ATCA constituted
merely a jurisdictional statute or also provided a substantive cause of
action.28 3 Congress textually stipulated torture and extrajudicial kill-
ing to clarify and expand, not to exhaust, the possible causes of action.
The congressional subcommittee asked for assurances from its wit-
nesses that the legislation would endorse rather than weaken other
claims under § 1350 law.284 Representative Yatron, a principal spon-
sor of the bill and chair of its originating subcommittee, began the
House hearings with this understanding:
International human rights violators visiting or residing in the
United States have formerly been held liable to money damages
under the Alien Tort Claims Act. It is not the intent of the Con-
gress to weaken this law, but to strengthen and clarify it. Federal
courts should not allow congressional actions with respect to this
legislation to prejudice positive developments, but rather to act
upon existing law when ruling on the cases presently before
them.28 5
In short, Congress wanted to confirm Filartiga's apprehension of
§ 1350, and the TVPA presented such an opportunity. 286
To ensure that Representative Yatron's words were honored, the
House committee report provided clear support for prospective fed-
eral common law incorporation of other customary international
283. In the first-generation of scholarship regarding the ATCA, much of the discus-
sion focused on whether § 1350 was merely a jurisdictional statute or also included a
substantive cause of action. According to congressional testimony, the TVPA offered
Congress an opportunity to end that debate by demonstrating the inherent substan-
tive component of the statute. Senate TVPA Hearings, supra note 254, at 40-41 (ex-
plaining that TVPA would "eliminate any uncertainty here and would compliment the
ongoing litigation efforts under the Alien Tort Claims Act" (emphasis added)); The
Torture Victim Protection Act: Hearing and Markup Before the House Comm. on For-
eign Affairs and Its Subcomm. on Human Rights and Int'l Org., 100th Cong., 86-87
(1988) [hereinafter TVPA House Hearings] (statement of Rep. Solomon) ("[The
TVPAJ will serve, in my judgment, to clarify a technical point in the existing law.").
284. TVPA House Hearings, supra note 283, at 71-72 (statement of Rep. Yatron)
(asking all panelists to assure committee that the TVPA would not weaken the
ATCA).
285. Id. at 71 (statement of Rep. Yatron).
286. Id. at 72 (statement of Patricia Rengel) (presenting TVPA as mechanism for
"codif[ying] in a way for the nation as a whole what were the intentions... of those
framers of Section 1350").
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human rights law: "[Cilaims based on torture or summary executions
do not exhaust the list of actions that may appropriately be covered by
section 1350. That statute should remain intact to permit suits based
on other norms that already exist or may ripen in the future into rules
of customary international law."'  This language ought to satisfy the
revisionist default rule. Congress affirmatively left these other areas
of CIL relatively open-ended. In this capacity, the TVPA's sanction is
forward looking; courts are free to interpret and apply CIL norms that
currently exist as well as those that may emerge.
Thus far we have addressed the TVPA's implications for CIL as fed-
eral common law only prospectively. That analysis should secure Fi-
lartiga's footing for future litigation. Yet, this Article's discussion has
left unanswered the question of Filartiga's status prior to the TVPA,
which also implicates § 1350 litigation that will continue outside of the
TVPA. More significantly, by all appearances, we have helped prove
a significant part of the revisionist position. That is, Judge Bork was
right: federal judges should not have extended § 1350's cause of ac-
tion to post-eighteenth century conceptions of CIL, unless a contem-
porary Congress had already done so. Or, as the revisionist position
might put it: In ATCA suits, courts should not have incorporated
modern CIL into federal common law in the face of political branch
silence. Thus, according to the revisionist account, the TVPA vali-
dates their interbranch claim that Congress, the appropriate institu-
tion for these matters, responded synergistically to provide the
necessary political direction that judges required before acting. The
following section argues that the TVPA's legislative history belies this
account.
C. Reading the ATCA in Light of the TVPA
The legislative history of the TVPA demonstrates Congress's view
of the modern position. Two very different accounts could explain
Congress's action: (1) the revisionist position-Congress in its institu-
tional capacity provided needed political branch direction for federal
judges who could not legitimately incorporate CIL without such a di-
rective; or (2) the modern position-Filartiga was correctly decided
according to federal common law powers, and subsequent congres-
sional action was primarily remedial for opposing judges who rejected
Filartiga's reasoning. Indeed, as a corollary to the revisionist perspec-
tive, one might contend that if Filartiga was firmly grounded in its use
of federal common law, the TVPA would not have been required.
Conversely, the modern position would be strongly supported by
287. House Report, supra note 261, at 86.
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proof that Congress considered its legislative action to be
redundant. 88
Numerous statements from the legislative history dispute the char-
acterization of the TVPA as illustrating that Congress, rather than the
courts, is better positioned to fine-tune the application of CIL to the
requirements of other domestic law. In particular, the legislative his-
tory contains important, retrospective congressional statements re-
garding the legitimacy of Filartiga's doctrinal basis. Senator Specter,
the TVPA's main sponsor, considered its legislative stamp of approval
to be primarily superfluous, yet a necessary corrective measure for the
anomalous turn by the D.C. Circuit: "One might think... it would be
unnecessary to have legislation on such a subject, because torture is
such a heinous offense, such a heinous crime, that the courts would
have jurisdiction without a formal legislative measure. This is neces-
sary because of litigated cases in the field, most particularly [Tel-
Oren]. '28 9 Judge Bork's wayward turn had apparently raised a legisla-
tive eyebrow, 290 and the TVPA was adopted specifically to counter his
disagreeable stand.29' The Congress both lauded § 1350 case law
(which developed absent explicit contemporary political branch au-
thorization) and acted to sustain Filartiga's momentum: "The TVPA
would establish an unambiguous and modem basis for a cause of ac-
tion that has been successfully maintained under an existing law, [the
ATCA]. Section 1350 has other important uses and should not be
replaced. ,292
288. It is impossible, of course, to find a statement that the legislative action was
wholly redundant since it included a novel extension of the permissible plaintiff class
to include U.S. citizens. As our discussion reveals, Congress considered this "gap
filling" measure the only item that would actually change § 1350's case law. As far as
Congress was concerned, the rest of the TVPA clarified what was already there. 137
Cong. Rec. S1378 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1991) (statement of Sen. Specter) ("This bill
closes a gap in the law. Under court decisions, aliens have the right to sue their tor-
turers under the Alien Tort Claims Act, but not U.S. citizens. This bill would extend
protection to U.S. citizens while retaining the current law's protection of aliens." (em-
phasis added)); see also 135 Cong. Rec. 22716 (1989) (statement of Sen. Leach)
(describing clarifying intent of TVPA to ensure continuation of ATCA judicial
successes).
289. These were Senator Specter's first words by way of introduction of the bill to
the 102nd Congress. 137 Cong. Rec. S1378 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1991).
290. Senate Report, supra note 270, at 4-5 (contrasting Judge Bork's anomalistic
stance with the fact that, otherwise, "the Filartiga case has met with general
approval").
291. Senate TVPA Hearings, supra note 254, at 65 (Statement of Sen. Specter)
("Well, that is why the legislation is really brought. The Tel-Oren case ... and this
bill will lay it all to rest."); House Report, supra note 261, at 86-87; Senate Report,
supra note 270, at 4; see also Rachael E. Schwartz, "And Tommorrow?" The Torture
Victim Protection Act, 11 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 271, 284 (1994) ("[Wlhile giving
Judge Bork the expression of legislative intent upon which he had insisted, Congress
also admonished him that he was wrong to require it in the first place.").
292. House Report, supra note 261, at 3.
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In short, the Senate Report contains meaningful analysis of Filartiga
and its progeny, which proceeded without the 1992 legislative action.
The congressional analysis uniformly approves of the prevailing judi-
cial interpretations of international law. Specifically, the Senate Re-
port cites other ATCA cases to underscore its position: "[T]orture or
summary executions do not exhaust the list of action that may appro-
priately be covered by section 1350. 1293
D. The Paradox of Political Branch Authorization of the Modern
Position
The legislative history of the TVPA calls into question a fundamen-
tal assumption of the revisionist position: Do the political branches
favor the modern position?294 As discussed in part III, Congress of-
fered strong indications of support for the modem position in adopt-
ing the TVPA.295 Specifically, in this section we want to highlight four
ways in which the Congress "authorized" the modern position that
CIL is federal common law. First, Congress suggested that interpret-
ing international law exceeds the institutional capacity of state courts:
"[S]tate courts are not likely to be inclined or well-suited to consider
[international law] cases. 296 Second, Congress expressly stated that
CIL is federal common law: "International human rights cases predict-
ably raise legal issues-such as interpretations of international law-that
are matters of Federal common law and within the particular expertise
of Federal courts. ' '297 Third, Congress in part explained its constitu-
tional authority to create alien-alien causes of action by citing Paquete
Habana's broad assertion: "International law is part of our law.""98
Fourth, Congress cited the Filartiga precedent with approval.219 In-
deed, Congress arguably utilized the Filartiga holding and its progeny
as the model for fashioning the cause of action established in the
TVPA.30  The understanding of Filartiga which Congress approved
strongly suggests congressional endorsement of the modem position:
After finding that torture has been condemned and renounced as an
instrument of official policy by virtually all countries of the world,
293. Senate Report, supra note 270, at 4 n.2 ("For example, outside of the torture
and summary execution content, several Federal court decisions have relied on sec.
1350." (citing Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246
(1985))); see also Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 864 (D. Md. 1961).
294. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary. International Law, supra note 24, at 869
("Far from authorizing the application of the new CIL as domestic federal law, the
political branches have made clear that they do not want the new CIL to have domes-
tic law status.").
295. See text accompanying notes 254-319.
296. Senate Report, supra note 270, at 6 n.6.
297. Id (emphasis added).
298. See id. at n.4 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900)); see also 135
Cong. Rec. 22716 (1989) (statement of Sen. Leach).
299. See Senate Report, supra note 270.
300. See supra notes 288-89.
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Chief Judge Irving R. Kaufman further held that customary interna-
tional law provides individuals with the right to be free from torture
by government officials. Consequently, section 1350 gave Federal
courts jurisdiction over allegations of torture since torture violates
the "law of nations., 301
The legislative history makes clear a single-minded commitment not
to have the TVPA disturb the ongoing ATCA litigation under sepa-
rate causes of action. This evidence of political branch support for the
modern position demonstrates Congress' expectation that federal
courts will find and apply CIL.
The claim that the political branches accept the modern view seems,
at first blush, paradoxical. Common law, after all, refers to judicial
lawmaking in the absence of political branch authorization. The revi-
sionists might claim that the critique of the modern position chal-
lenges only common law making in the face of political branch silence
or opposition. According to the revisionist view, the evidence we
have provided demonstrates Congress' relatively narrow consent to
the incorporation of CIL pursuant to the TVPA. Recalling that the
force of the revisionist position resides in its application to future sce-
narios wherein courts are confronted with congressional silence, the
arguments advanced in this section might seem to beg the question.
The agreement among the political and judicial branches on the pro-
priety of the modern position, however, restructures the way scholars,
lawyers, and judges should go about constructing default rules. Con-
gress generally supports the understanding of CIL as federal law often
found and applied by federal judges. As such, the revisionist default
rule governing CIL incorporation reflects an inappropriate presump-
tion. Universal CIL norms should be considered federal common law
in the absence of a political branch signal to the contrary.
E. Our Rebuttal to Bradley and Goldsmith's Response
Bradley and Goldsmith's response to our discussion of the TVPA
demonstrates the malleability of the revisionist default rule. Their ar-
gument effectively strips the legislation of its meaning. First, they take
the position that Congress, in passing the TVPA, did not endorse the
Filartiga approach. Second, and more provocatively, they suggest that
the TVPA should be interpreted as a limitation on § 1350 suits-to
include only torture and extrajudicial killings. Bradley and Gold-
smith's position frustrates the very democratic principles to which
their project purportedly aspires to uphold. That is, their interpreta-
tion of the TVPA resists the express statements of the 1992 Congress,
and introduces what Congress perhaps feared most in passing the leg-
islation-undermining the modern litigation.
301. Senate Report, supra note 270, at 3-4 (emphasis added).
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Before addressing Bradley and Goldsmith's position specifically, it
is worth noting that the TVPA received only passing treatment in ear-
lier revisionists' works, 30 z despite the statute's strong connections to
Filartiga and the modem ATCA litigation. The revisionist account of
the TVPA indicated only a superficial read of the statute's title,30 3 and
never spoke to even the possible significance of the pervasive endorse-
ments of Filartiga throughout the legislative history. This surface
treatment of what has been termed by federal courts as the
"codif[ication] '"304 and "endorse[ment] ' '3 15 of the Filartiga doctrine,
while at the same time assailing that doctrine for inadequate political
branch support, casts doubt on the revisionist enterprise.
The spin that Bradley and Goldsmith now put on the legislative
background to the TVPA is also ill-founded. As we had antici-
pated,0 6 Bradley and Goldsmith now offer the following account of
the legislation's context: Congress provided a new cause of action
under § 1350 in order to satisfy the appropriate demand of Judge Bork
that courts need to receive such political authorization before act-
ing.30 7 Although we already responded to this version of history
above, it is worth emphasizing the common view on these matters:
"[W]hile giving Judge Bork the expression of legislative intent upon
which he had insisted, Congress also admonished him that he was
wrong to require it in the first place. "'"3 s Moreover, Bradley and
Goldsmith offer no response to the statements by individual congres-
sional representatives and the committee reports, indicating that the
TVPA was, indeed, largely redundant with regard to suits by nonci-
tizens under the ATCA. The TVPA did not create a new cause of
action for noncitizens, but instead rebuked Judge Bork for not recog-
nizing it was already there.
The legislative record is also filled with statements by the bill's
sponsors, other legislators, and expert witnesses, all agreeing that the
302. Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 24, at 873;
Weisburd, State Courts, supra note 24, at 3-4.
303. Bradley and Goldsmith explained that the TVPA was a proper act of incorpo-
ration "with respect to torture cases;" cited Arthur Weisburd's similarly brief state-
ments about the TVPA; and stated that "[b]y creating a federal cause of action for
torture, the Act arguably provides a basis for federal question jurisdiction for suits
involving torture." Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note
24, at 873 & n.356 (emphasis added).
304. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767,778 (9th Cir. 1996); Kadic v. Karadzic,
74 F.3d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 181 n.2
(D. Mass. 1995) (stating that "in enacting the TVPA. Congress has expressed its ap-
proval of the Filartiga line of cases").
305. Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (l1th Cir. 1996) (-In enacting the
TVPA, Congress endorsed the Filartiga line of cases .. "); Xuncar, 886 F. Supp. at
172 ("In enacting the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Congress apparently
endorsed this approach.").
306. See supra text accompanying notes 288-89.
307. Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights Litigation, supra note 24, at 363-65.
308. Schwartz, supra note 291, at 284.
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TVPA would-and should-act as an endorsement of the Filartiga lit-
igation.30 9 This understanding finds clear expression in both the
House and Senate Reports.310 Nevertheless, Bradley and Goldsmith
assert the opposite: "It is extremely unlikely that the members of
Congress who demanded these changes and ultimately voted for the
TVPA would have assented to the much broader, open-ended, and
undefined Filartiga approach .... [T]he TVPA should not be read as
implicitly ratifying Filartiga."311 Such inferences can only be drawn by
ignoring the clear statements by Congress that it intended not to dis-
turb, but rather to "strengthen and clarify" the Filartiga doctrine. No
direct statements by a single congressperson support Bradley and
Goldsmith's position.
Thus, when Bradley and Goldsmith object that Congress would not
narrowly stipulate two causes of action and leave the others open-
ended, they are flatly wrong. Congress left the other causes of action
unstipulated in order to have the federal courts develop the doctrine
accordingly.31 In rebuttal, Bradley and Goldsmith characterize our
evidence as "consist[ing] exclusively of snippets of legislative his-
tory. '313 Their minimization of the importance of the TVPA's legisla-
tive history in this regard is indefensible. Consider, for example, the
amicus brief of leading federal jurisdiction and international law
professors-including Professors David Bederman, Erwin Chemerin-
sky, William Dodge, Martha Field, Burke Marshall, Judith Resnik,
David Shapiro, and William Van Alsytne-submitted to the Supreme
Court:
Congress erased all doubt about the effect of the ATCA to author-
ize suit when it enacted the Torture Victim Protection Act of
1991 .... Both the House and Senate Reports expressly evince
Congress's understanding that a "remedy" for such offenses was
"already available" to aliens under the ATCA. Further, the legisla-
tive history emphasizes that the ATCA "should remain intact to per-
mit suits based on other norms that already exist or may ripen in the
future into rules of customary international law.31 4
309. See supra text accompanying notes 288-89.
310. Id.
311. Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights Litigation, supra note 24, at 367-68.
312. Congress, thus, in the background of the legislation provided its reasons for
not stipulating other causes of action; yet members of the revisionist camp fail to
listen. Instead, Bradley and Goldsmith, in rebuttal, further define the degree of speci-
fication requirement for the revisionist default rule. In the face of the TVPA's legisla-
tive history, they now assert the need for direct, textually explicit legislative
statements to permit federal courts to incorporate CIL as federal law. This move
seems to be a hardening of their position, notably to a point that, we believe, practi-
cally takes the "common" out of "federal common law."
313. Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights Litigation, supra note 24, at 363.
314. See also Brief of Amici Curiae Professors David E. Bederman et al., at 9-10
Karadzic v. Doe, (No. 95-1599) (quoting House Report, supra note 261, and Senate
Report, supra note 270).
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The consensus of legal opinion expressed in the amicus brief recog-
nizes the significance of these extensive sections of the TVPA's legis-
lative history.
In addition, Bradley and Goldsmith contend that in passing the
TVPA, Congress was "far from ratifying the wholesale incorporation
of CIL assumed by Filartiga,"315 and that Congress did not "federalize
all CIL human rights prohibitions." '316 These arguments tilt at wind-
mills. We have been careful to explain that the Filartiga precedent
supports the incorporation of universal, obligatory and well-defined
CIL into federal common law; and that the TVPA stands for the same.
As we explained, this narrow band of CIL encompasses only jus
cogens violations such as torture, extrajudicial killings, genocide, dis-
appearances, and slavery. We have never assumed that Congress
adopted (or would adopt) a "wholesale incorporation" of all CIL, nor
that the federal courts under Filartiga would accept "wholesale incor-
poration," either. Accordingly, Bradley and Goldsmith's responses
miss the mark and simply confuse the issue. For example, "it makes
no sense whatsoever," they write, "to read the TVPA as implicitly fed-
eralizing, without procedural or substantive limitation, other CIL
human rights norms, most of which are much less settled and central
than torture and extrajudicial killing. '317 Such statements, which form
a central part of Bradley and Goldsmith's rebuttal, are easy to make,
yet avoid the crux of the argument.
Moreover, Bradley and Goldsmith not only argue that Congress did
not endorse the Filartiga line of cases, they also suggest that the TVPA
should be understood as a statutory narrowing of § 1350 litigation to
only torture and extrajudicial killings.3 18 Their argument here strays
farthest from democratic principles by turning a deaf ear to the will of
Congress.319 If nothing else, one concern pervaded the legislative his-
tory of the TVPA: Adoption of the statute, including the specification
of two causes of action, should not hinder the successful development
of other causes of action under the ATCA.320 Congress emphatically
tried to prevent the misuses of the TVPA to which Bradley and Gold-
smith put it.
315. Bradley & Goldsmith, Hianan Rights Litigation, supra note 24, at 364 (empha-
sis added).
316. Id at 366 (emphasis added).
317. Id. (emphasis added).
318. Id. at 365-66 (emphasis added).
319. See supra note 276 (discussing the desire of Congress to butress § 1350 litiga-
tion with the TVPA).
320. See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 380 (E.D. La. 1997)
("Congress did not intend for the TVPA to impinge on the scope of § 1350 or change
the 'law of nations.' Congress clearly meant for 'other norms' and future rules of
international customary law to be redressable under § 1350."); see also supra text ac-
companying notes 295-98.
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Ultimately, the position Bradley and Goldsmith stake out on the
TVPA reveals a great deal about both the substantive character and
the potential abuses of the revisionist default rule. The consensus
view is that Congress, in passing the TVPA: (1) At a minimum, tried
to ensure the act would not undermine the litigation of other causes of
action under the ATCA; and (2) expressly endorsed the principal
contours of the Filartiga doctrine.21 Yet, Bradley and Goldsmith
quarrel with the record and infer the opposite of express congres-
sional statements. In short, Bradley and Goldsmith's attempt to de-
nude the legislation of its well-understood meaning points to the
hollowness of their democracy and separation-of-powers concerns; it
also indicates the unsettling malleability of the revisionists' standards
for determining both what constitutes a political branch signal and
why the signal matters.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since Judge Kaufman's now famous opinion in Filartiga, U.S. fed-
eral courts have played an increasingly important role in the transna-
tional struggle to promote fundamental human rights.3 22 Until the
enactment of the TVPA in 1992, the Filartiga case line developed
without explicit political branch authorization of the sort prescribed in
the revisionist default rule. During this period-from Filartiga to the
TVPA- federal courts embraced the modern position that CIL is fed-
eral common law. We explained in part II that federal courts-relying
on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Sabbatino-fashioned federal
common law causes of action in ATCA cases. As such, the pre-TVPA
§ 1350 case law heavily relied on the modern position. As we de-
scribed in part III, however, the TVPA changed the jurisprudential
landscape. In the post-TVPA era, federal courts no longer need the
modern position to find federal causes of action in § 1350 cases (the
political branches authorized virtually every cause of action that had
succeeded in the Filartiga line).
The interplay between the TVPA and the structure of the modern
litigation suggests two related rejoinders to the revisionist position.
321. See supra notes 283-93 and accompanying text (discussing the purposes of the
TVPA).
322. The importance of this role should not be underestimated. Justice Powell rec-
ognized the critical contribution of U.S. courts:
Until international tribunals command a wider constituency, the courts of
various countries afford the best means for the development of a respected
body of international law. There is less hope for progress in this long-ne-
glected area if the resolution of all disputes involving an "an act of state" is
relegated to political rather than judicial processes.
First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 775 (1972) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Why Nations Obey: A Theory of
Compliance with International Law (forthcoming) (describing transnational legal pro-
cess that generates compliance with international rules); Harold Hongju Koh, Why do
Nations Obey International Law?, 106 Yale L.J. 2599 (1997) (same).
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First, clearly, the revisionist critique of the modern position does not
affect the ongoing § 1350 litigation.3  Second, Congress's explicit en-
dorsement of the modem position-including the Filartiga line's reli-
ance on the modem view-discredits the normative and conceptual
underpinnings of the broader revisionist project. As we outlined in
part III, § 1350, as understood by both Congress and the federal
courts, counsels against accepting the revisionist position.
Indeed, for nearly twenty years, the federal government-through
Republican and Democratic administrations, Congresses controlled
by both parties, and numerous federal courts-has spoken with one
voice on the status of CIL in U.S. law: Universally-recognized human
rights are judicially-cognizable federal law. 324
323. The revisionists recognize that § 1350 litigation is unaffected by their formula-
tions. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customar' International Law, supra note 24, at 871-
72 (suggesting that demise of the modem position need not alter ongoing ATCA liti-
gation); Weisburd, Executive Brand, supra note 24, at 1247 n.190 (same).
324. Of course, the political branches could, and often do, limit or qualify the incor-
poration of universal CIL into U.S. law. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights
Litigation, supra note 24, at 340 (discussing United States treaty RUDs as evidence of
political branch opposition to the modem position). This does not, however, diminish
the strength of the modem position. Simply put, our analysis demonstrates that the
revisionist default rule runs in the wrong direction: Universal CIL is federal common
law unless the political branches clearly limit the scope of its application in U.S. law.
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